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 Between June 1863 and May 1865, almost seven thousand Union prisoners 
were held in two Confederate prisoner of war camps in Texas:  Camp Groce near 
Hempstead, Texas, and Camp Ford near Tyler, Texas.  While both camps had their share 
of misery, Camp Ford was considered a “model camp” and had one of the lowest death 
rates of any Civil War prison.  Camp Groce, in contrast, was a site of immense suffering 
and a death rate that would make it one of the deadliest camps on other side throughout the 
war.  Between the two camps, death rates ranged from 3.86% to nearly 30% in less than a 
two year period, despite their similarities in size, structure, and development.  What role 
did the outside environment, as well as the internal conditions, play in survival?  This thesis 
will explore the history and conditions of Camp Groce and Camp Ford, and contrast the 
internal and external effects that influenced morale and the rate of survival in each camp. 
In doing so, I will focus on five primary factors: 
1.) The effect of the natural environment on the physical and sanitary conditions,  
      including the availability of fresh water, abundance of vegetation, and access to  
      resources 
 2.) The effect of the local, or non-natural environment, on morale and overall  
      health, including interactions with nearby townspeople, frequency of  
      commerce, and access to medical care 
 3.) The consequences of having a harsh Confederate camp commander versus one  





 4.) The role the Union officers played in establishing not only discipline, but also  
      in providing order and structure to an otherwise chaotic environment 
 5.) The impact of daily activities on the spirit of the prisoners, including not only 
       the necessary work, but also recreational activities 
 
A comparison will also be made between the Texas camps and two of the most well-
known, and much larger, prisoner of war camps in the east:  Elmira Prison, a Union 
prison in New York, and Andersonville Prison, a Confederate camp in Georgia. 
 The research for this thesis has been taken predominately from a variety of original 
sources, including diaries, personal letters, testimony, and military records that will make 
up the bulk of the primary sources.  Secondary sources have been utilized for basic 
information, including works by historians such as Ovid L. Futch, Michael P. Gray, and 
William Best Hesseltine. A treasure trove of unpublished personal letters and accounts of 
Camp Ford were located at the Smith County Historical Society in Tyler, Texas.  In 
addition, a host of government records and newspapers from the time period are accessible 
online and contain a wealth of information.  Research was also conducted among the 
libraries of Sam Houston State University, Baylor University, and Texas A&M University, 
as well as numerous other online databases.  Finally, descendants of the Camp Groce 
commandant, Colonel Clayton C. Gillespie, and other Civil War prisoners of war, have 
provided unpublished, personal writings and family accounts of their ancestors. 
The historiography of Confederate prisoner of war camps in Texas is a subject 
matter that has not been researched extensively, nor written on substantially.  There are 
only two known publications that provide any extensive account of the history of Camp 





Francis Lisarelli (1999), and Camp Ford CSA: The Story of Union Prisoners in Texas, by 
F. Lee Lawrence and Dr. Robert Glover (1964).  Both provide a comprehensive telling of 
the historical facts; however, neither provides an interpretive discussion of the elements 
affecting the camps, nor add to the overall historiography of the dissimilarities of the 
prisons, and the long term consequences.  In addition, few publications (Civil War Prison: 
A Study in War Psychology by Hesseltine (1930) being one of the few exceptions) have 
ever examined the entire prisoner of war system, both North and South. 
  Although at least one prior thesis has dealt with the subject of Camp Ford (Amy 
L. Klemm, Wigwam Metropolis: Camp Ford, Texas. October 1996), I am unaware of any 
paper or publication that has discussed or compared both camps.  Once completed, my 
thesis will be the first in-depth analysis of both prisoner of war camps in Texas, as well as 
the first to create a compare and contrast with other camps based upon the five previously 
mentioned factors. 
 
Keywords: Civil War, Camp Groce, Camp Ford, Andersonville, Elmira, Natural 
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Chapter I   
Introduction and Background 
Near a trickling creek in Waller County, Texas, where today the silence is 
interrupted by passing cars on the nearby highways, lies the remains of Camp Groce.  
Largely forgotten and generally unnoticed today by the public, Camp Groce was the first 
permanent Confederate prisoner of war camp located west of the Mississippi River.  
Between its establishment in June of 1863, until the last prisoners were paroled in 
December, 1864, the camp was the site of disease, despair, cruelty, and the deaths of over 
200 Union soldiers, sailors, and civilians.   Almost 185 miles to the northeast of Camp 
Groce, near the city of Tyler, Texas, is the site of Camp Ford, the largest Confederate prison 
camp west of the Mississippi.   Today well marked and maintained by the Smith County 
Historical Society, Camp Ford housed over 6,000 prisoners between July, 1863, and May, 
1865, in conditions considered favorable in comparison not only to Camp Groce, but also 
to the more infamous prison camps in the east.  While both camps certainly had their share 
of misery, Camp Ford was considered a “model camp” and had one of the lowest death 
rates of any American Civil War prison.  In contrast, during the latter period of Camp 
Groce’s operation, the death rate would soar to nearly 30%, rivaling the prison camps at 
Elmira and Andersonville, generally regarded as the two deadliest prisons of the war.  With 
the two Texas camps being relatively close in proximity, under the same Confederate 
command and supply structure, and at times, housing the same prisoners, why were the 
overall conditions, morale, and frequency of illness and death so different between them?  






Equally intriguing, why have Camp Groce and Camp Ford, with their unique 
characteristics and parallels to their counterparts east of the Mississippi, been largely 
ignored by historians and scholars alike in the vast sea of Civil War prison historiography?  
 In examining the distinctions between the two Texas camps, and the eventual 
comparison to the larger camps in the east, a few common characteristics became self-
evident.  Almost all camps were located far from the field of battle, making their proximity 
to combat mostly a non-factor until their liberation by advancing armies in the final stages 
of the war.  All camps struggled with disease and issues surrounding poor sanitation.  Along 
with providing proper medical care, all camps faced the same basic issues of providing 
adequate food, clothing, and shelter for the prisoners.  While both sides publicly 
acknowledged that prisoners deserved a reasonable level of comfort and care, the systems 
in place broke down under crowded conditions, leaving the prisoners at the mercy of the 
elements and poor management.  And yet with so much commonality amongst the various 
prisons, the likelihood that any one particular prisoner would survive his ordeal varied 
greatly from camp to camp, leaving us with the simple question of why.  Upon further 
examination, five primary factors arose that deserve the most consideration for their impact 
on prisoner attitude, morale, and survival:   First, the effect of the natural environment on 
the physical and sanitary conditions, including the availability of fresh water, abundance 
of vegetation, and access to resources.  Second, the effect of the local, or non-natural 
environment on morale and overall health, including interactions with nearby townspeople, 
frequency of commerce, and access to medical care.   Third, the consequence of having an 
unsympathetic camp commander versus one with a more benevolent attitude towards the 






providing order and structure to an otherwise chaotic environment.  And finally, fifth, the 
impact of daily activities on the spirit of the prisoners, including not only the necessary 
work, but also recreational activities such as music, crafting, games of chance, and even 
baseball.   
 As we examine each of these factors, it is important to acknowledge that a 
prisoner’s personal approach to his incarceration had a lasting impact on his chances of 
survival.  Such approach not only included a POW’s overt actions to improve his 
conditions, but also his state of mental well-being that either encouraged him to press on, 
or discouraged efforts to help himself, instead resigning him to his fate.  The old adage that 
“if a man believes he is going to die, he will probably find a way to do so” unfortunately 
often rings true with prisoners of war.  Such realities of prisoner attitudes may help us to 
understand why some men endured their incarceration for extended periods of time, while 
others withered away within weeks of entering a camp.  In Nature’s Civil War (2013), 
historian Kathryn Shively Meier tackles this issue of soldier’s looking out for themselves.  
Throughout their period of military service, Civil War soldiers practiced what Meier called 
“self care” in order to survive.  This practice included foraging for additional food, 
improving their shelter, tending to their own medical and sanitation needs, and exploiting 
nature to their advantage.  While her book is limited to the study of soldiers in Virginia in 
1862, her narrative on the healthiest soldiers practicing self-care resonates throughout the 
entire Civil War experience, including life as a POW.  Simply put “soldiers were 
confronted with a dire choice: accept responsibility for their own bodies or succumb to 
illness and possibly death.”  Self-care required individuality, and “those who remained 






to quantify that physical health.  Letters home and post-war recollections do not often paint 
an accurate picture of a soldier’s actual mental state during imprisonment, but nevertheless 
help historians to understand prisoner attitudes.  The concept of self-care as it relates to 
physical and mental health will be seen throughout our analysis of the five factors. 
Historiography of U.S. Civil War Prisons 
Our collective fascination with the American Civil War has understandably focused 
on battles, the great armies, and the individuals who went above and beyond in the face of 
danger.  With their tales of heroism and tragedy, patriotism and causes, military conflicts 
and the decisions and events surrounding them have dominated the war’s historiography 
since its final days in 1865.  In contrast, the less glamorous narrative of Civil War prisons 
has received considerably less attention from historians, as well as the general public.  As 
Andersonville survivor Ezra Ripple would comment in his 1902 memoir, “we would all 
sooner listen to a description of a grand battle where all the bravery and dash of trained 
soldiers in assault and defense is portrayed in the most vivid and glowing colors than to a 
tale which has little in it but that which is revolting, sickening and sorrowful.”2     Even 
less has been written about the camps west of the Mississippi.  While one can easily find a 
litany of books written on the more infamous prisons of the east, such as Andersonville, 
Libby, Elmira, Camp Douglas, and Rock Island, there are only two known publications 
that provide any extensive account of the history of Camp Groce or Camp Ford:  The Last 
Prison: The Untold Story of Camp Groce CSA, by Danial Francis Lisarelli (1999), and 
Camp Ford CSA: The Story of Union Prisoners in Texas, by F. Lee Lawrence and Dr. 
Robert Glover (1964).  While these micro-monographs both provide a comprehensive 






number of prisoners, and their respective fates, neither rise above being anything more than 
a narrative-driven timeline of events.  Neither provide an interpretive discussion of the 
elements affecting the camps, or any sort of analytical discussion as to why the varying 
forms of treatment and care occurred.  Such publications also fail to contribute to the larger 
historiographical picture of Civil War incarceration by limiting their narrative to a single 
camp, instead of comparing and contrasting the similarities and dissimilarities with other 
prisons on both sides.  Few works by other authors make any reference at all to Camp 
Groce and Camp Ford, and even then only in passing with a general comment as to their 
location.  Historian Charles W. Sanders, Jr. is one of the few to mention them by name in 
his book While in the Hands of the Enemy (2005); however, even after acknowledging 
them as “major installations in the trans-Mississippi theater,” he summarily dismisses their 
importance to his narrative of laying blame for prison atrocities on poor government, and 
says they will be “addressed only in passing.”  Other than this casual mention in his 
introduction, Sanders does not reference them again in his lengthy 316 page book.3   
 Even with the considerable volume of books written about the eastern prison 
camps, or the prison system as a whole, few attempt to compare the conditions from one 
camp to the next, or provide an explanation for the various degrees of suffering seen 
throughout.  A rare early exception would be William Best Hesseltine’s groundbreaking 
work Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology (1930) that ninety years later remains 
one of the few publications to attempt to examine the entire prisoner of war system, both 
North and South.  Hesseltine was trying to explain the wartime “psychosis” that allowed 
both sides to believe the worst in the other when it came to the treatment of prisoners.  The 






mistreatment of prisoners in each side’s care.  While his work does make some direct 
comparisons between camps, Hesseltine’s primary focus was on explaining how post-war 
opinion was affected by propaganda, prisoner accounts, and the psychology of war.  He 
avoided any discussion of why the camps were different, and ignored determining factors.  
Thus, a comprehensive analysis and interpretation of the dissimilarities of the prisons, and 
how all parties were affected, remained elusive.  Hesseltine did encourage other historians 
to take a broad approach to prison history; however, few in the decades to come followed 
his lead.  Portals to Hell: Military Prisons of the Civil War (1997) by amateur historian 
Lonnie Speer was the first attempt in over sixty years to provide an overall review of all 
Civil War prisons.  While the lengthy publication succeeds in providing a summary of 
nearly all camps, including the rare mention of Camp Groce and Camp Ford, the work fails 
to address problems within the prison system, and once again does not provide any 
analytical discussion of what factors separated one camp from another.   
Micro-monographs such as The Business of Captivity (2001) by Michael P. Gray 
about the Elmira Prison, and History of Andersonville Prison (1968) by Ovid L. Futch, 
have dominated prison historiography in the decades since the war and have provided a 
valuable, albeit limited, snapshot of individual prisons.  While certainly an important 
resource, such works typically have not interpreted each camps role in the larger prison 
system, nor have they addressed the much needed comparison with other prisons.  One 
minor exception would be John K. Derden’s The World’s Largest Prison: The Story of 
Camp Lawton (2012) which intertwines the micro-narrative of Camp Lawton with the 
broader places and events in Georgia, including its connection to Andersonville, Macon, 






archaeology and history by documenting the archaeological “discovery” of the camp in 
2010. 
 Over the last two decades, the micro analysis that had been so prevalent started 
giving way to more and more works focusing on the macro level of prison historiography.  
While not exactly following the lead of Hesseltine, these macro-monographs take a broader 
brush to Civil War POW experiences by focusing on environment, governmental policy, 
sanitation, collective memories, and cultural aspects, just to name a few, among a group of 
camps or across the prison systems.  Crossing the Deadlines: Civil War Prisons 
Reconsidered (2018), a collection of nine essays compiled and edited by Michael P. Gray, 
tackled such diverse topics as religion, environment, disease, black prisoners, dark tourism, 
archaeology, and memories, on a broad scale.  In his essay, Nature and Prisons, Evan A. 
Kutzler argues that the study of environmental history is crucial to the wider study of prison 
policy and management as its consideration takes the study “beyond the question of whose 
prisons were more wretched” questioning “not management versus mismanagement, but 
one environmental choice versus another.”4   In a later chapter entitled Civil War Prisons, 
Memory, and the Problem of Reconciliation, Benjamin G. Cloyd cautions historians that 
modern attempts to recast prisons in a more central Civil War role via soldier’s memoirs 
must acknowledge that sectional hatred, lingering hostility, and racial recriminations 
clouded post-war recollections.5  Furthering his emphasis on the environment experienced 
by POW’s, Evan A. Kutzler in his recent work, Living by Inches (2019), examines prisoner 
experiences, both North and South, through their basic senses of smell, hearing, taste, and 
touch, and the subsequent reactions to their environment.  The work “prioritizes imprisoned 






In doing so, Kutzler intertwines both the public and private aspects of prison life by 
showing that issues such as sanitation and lice were prevalent across all camps.   
Books such as War Stuff (2018) by Joan E. Cashin, while not focusing specifically 
on Civil War prisons, nevertheless addressed the constant struggle for resources by both 
soldiers and civilians.  She writes “most of the warriors of both armies – blue and gray – 
privileged their own needs over everything else.”7  This self-preservation extended into all 
aspects of life, including one’s time as a prisoner.  Similarly, Embattled Freedom (2018) 
by Amy Murrell Taylor, focused on the struggles of African Americans in slave refugee 
camps, but also raised comparisons to soldiers languishing in prisons.  Like refugees, 
POW’s were stripped of life’s most basic needs, often reducing survival to the individual 
rather than a collective endeavor.  Food, shelter, clothing, et al, became essential to 
“achieving a metaphoric place in freedom,” as well as survival, for both refugee and 
prisoner.8  In the simple task of finding a place to live, refugee experiences become 
relatable to prisoners at Andersonville, desperately trying to find and maintain their small 
patch of ground in a combative sea of humanity. 
 Continuing the macro theme, While in the Hands of the Enemy (2005) by Charles 
W. Sanders, Jr. looks at the prison systems as a whole on both sides to determine who was 
collectively at fault for the high death rates.  Saying he is confronting “the last bastion of 
revisionist Civil War historiography,” Sanders challenges the “stubborn refusal of 
scholars” to lay blame for the suffering and atrocities squarely on the shoulders of the 
leadership within the Union and Confederate governments.9  While the work is successful 
in painting a broad picture of bureaucratic incompetence and willful neglect on both sides, 






little to no blame on the commandants and guards at individual prisons.  In Haunted by 
Atrocity (2010), Benjamin G. Cloyd follows the post-war evolution of memories, 
remembrances, and observances of Civil War prisons.  Looking at prisons on a broad scale 
on both sides, the book shows how the camps took on different meanings and purposes for 
different groups, whether Yankee, Rebel, or emancipated African Americans.  By his own 
admission, Cloyd focuses primarily on Andersonville, and yet still manages to create a 
macro study by analyzing the collective memories across regional and racial lines.  The 
study of Civil War prisons must be part of a usable past, instead of just a controversial 
snapshot.  He laments that “the attraction of the Civil War as a national fairy tale continues 
to overshadow the need to confront more honestly the tragedies of American history.”10  In 
The Yankee Plague (2016), Lorien Foote integrates the collapse of the Confederate prison 
system with the collapse of the Confederacy as a whole, and details the effects that 
thousands of freed Yankee prisoners had on the South and its people.  In doing so, Foote 
goes beyond the usual narrative on the Civil War prisons to show their place and impact 
on the war, and the competing sides, in their entirety. 
With the current trend in Civil War historiography shifting from a micro to a macro 
approach, the question becomes where do we go from here.  Recent works have tended to 
focus on the personal experiences of soldiers, comparisons of conditions to lay blame, or 
the governmental policies and management that impacted the system as a whole.  What 
historians have failed to do, however, is merge these various approaches together to create 
a more comprehensive examination of the prisons.  My approach in this thesis is attempting 
to do just that, by examining not only policy, management, personal experiences, and 






inmates and their keepers.  In doing so, I will be taking a hybrid micro/macro approach that 
will look at individual prisons, but consider broad factors that are applicable across the 
entire system.  The purpose of this thesis is not to pass judgment, make excuses, or to lay 
blame for the suffering that occurred upon one side or the other, or at the feet of any one 
particular individual, group, or event.  In addition, this work is not simply a tale of two 
camps west of the Mississippi, but instead a comparison of multiple camps that vary greatly 
in size, location, and management.  Thus, the goal of this paper is threefold:  1.) to shed 
light on the long overlooked Texas camps and show that their examination is a valuable 
component of the overall historiography of Civil War prisons,  2.) provide a framework for 
historians to objectively examine Civil War prisons by using the five factors discussed 
herein, and 3.) contribute to the broader historical narrative by encouraging comprehensive 
comparisons of prisoner of war camps to seek out answers for why personal experiences 
and chances of survival varied so much from one prison to another.  In doing so, we can 
utilize the micro-monographs of individual prisons in the larger macro context of civil war 
incarceration, without narrowing our scope to just one set of environmental, political, or 
personal factors; and perhaps create from our study of Civil War prisons a usable past that 
Hesseltine, Cloyd, and so many others have sought out. 
Civil War Prisoner Exchange System 
 When the Civil War started in April of 1861, the idea that either side would need 
large facilities for prisoners, or an extensive supply network to care for them, was generally 
not up for consideration.  Military practice in the mid-nineteenth century prescribed that 
prisoners of war were to be exchanged, or released on parole to be exchanged at a later 






active duty until formally exchanged.  In practice, the system was certainly not without its 
flaws as the logistics of exchanges were often left up to the individual commanders after a 
conflict.  Nevertheless, the strategy served its purpose by alleviating both sides of the 
responsibility of caring for large numbers of enemy combatants for an extended period of 
time.  In July of 1862, Union General John A. Dix and Confederate General D.H. Hill 
negotiated the Dix-Hill Cartel, an agreement that “codified” the practice already in place 
between the two newly minted enemies.  Under the agreement, prisoners were to be 
immediately exchanged according to their rank.  Thereafter, any excess prisoners were to 
be paroled within ten days of capture after taking an oath not to rejoin their units until 
officially exchanged.  For the next six months, the cartel held, and prisoners were regularly 
exchanged with little controversy.  However, by early 1863, the system that seemed so 
simple in practice was beginning to crumble under practical concerns and political 
ideologies. 
 As historian Benjamin G. Cloyd points out, two primary issues “destroyed the 
supposedly permanent exchange process.”  First, soldiers released on parole were often left 
in that state of limbo for considerable periods of time while awaiting exchange.  Camps of 
non-fighting parolees consumed valuable resources, while many soldiers took advantage 
of the system to avoid future combat.  This loss of much needed men and supplies, 
especially for the South, forced both sides to return paroled prisoners to active duty prior 
to an official exchange, eroding the good will of the cartel.  As a practical matter “both the 
Union and Confederacy valued financial gain and military expedience more than prisoner’s 
lives,” much to the detriment of future captives.  Second, as the war entered its third full 






broke down what was left of the cartel agreement.  By mid-1863, large numbers of African 
Americans were enlisted in the Union army, and following the issuing of the Emancipation 
Proclamation earlier that year, slavery had become a moral rallying point for the North.11  
For a Southern Confederacy built upon racial inequality and slavery as the cornerstones of 
their existence, the idea of “exchanging a black man for a white man implied an inherent 
equality” that was simply unacceptable.12  By the end of 1863, the exchange process had 
broken down almost in its entirety.  Even in the latter part of 1864 when it was apparent to 
both sides that the conditions in POW camps were detrimental to those unfortunate to be 
there, officials such as General Ulysses Grant justified the lack of exchanges, “It is hard on 
our men in Southern prisons not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in the 
ranks to fight our battles . . .  if we commence a system of exchange which liberates all 
prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole South is exterminated.”13 
 As large numbers of prisoners began to accumulate, neither side was realistically 
prepared for what was to come.  Both sides scrambled to find former military camps, 
warehouses, islands, and any other places that were available, whether  adequate or not, to 
house the captives.  While the North eventually created at least a basic working system, 
aided by the Commissary Department and the U.S. Sanitation Commission, to house and 
care for the prisoners, and provide basic needs via a series of private contracts, the South 
never seemed to get its collective act together.  A tangled bureaucracy and a lack of 
effective leadership hampered Confederate efforts to adequately care for their prisoners, 
with little effort made to improve the system throughout the remainder of the war.  While 
Southern apologists have attempted to blame the conditions in Confederate prisons on 






throughout the South, historians such as Cloyd and Kutzler have argued that the South was 
at best grossly negligent in their duty to care for their prisoners.  Cloyd comments that 
while “some sympathy for the Confederacy’s slow reaction to the need for a well-defined 
prison system is legitimate . . . it remains inexcusable, even sinister, that, despite the 
momentum of war against it, the Confederacy never bothered to address the exigencies of 
prisoners of war.”14  Kutzler argues that “prison sanitation was never a high priority” in the 
South as they exhibited a “neglect of responsibility” to care for their prisoners.15  And yet 
as we will see, in the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederacy, the South was 
capable of running a camp that focused on sanitation, adequate supplies, and at least a basic 
level of care for their captives.  Camp Ford defies the stereotype of Southern prison camps 
with a remarkable death rate of less than 3.5% until overcrowding in mid-1864 created 
conditions to the detriment of the beneficial attributes of the camp. 
 The effects of the breakdown of the prisoner exchange system are immediately 
apparent to even the most casual observer of history.  The number of prisons increased on 
both sides, the number of soldiers incarcerated for long periods of time skyrocketed, and 
the death rates of inmates rose dramatically.  For most soldiers, staying on active duty to 
fight yet another battle was now preferable to being captured.  The raw numbers tell the 
story as well.  As economists Dora L. Costa and Matthew E. Kahn (who specialize in 
economic history and environmental economics respectively) point out in their longitudinal 
data study “Surviving Andersonville: the Benefits of Social Networks in POW Camps” 
(2007), while only 4% of soldiers captured prior to July 1863 died in captivity, the number 








  Prisoners of War in Texas 
The men that would soon be incarcerated at Camp Groce, with many eventually 
finding their way to Camp Ford, came from two primary fields of combat.  From the Battle 
of Galveston in January of 1863 came soldiers and sailors from the U.S.S. Harriet Lane 
and from states as far away as Massachusetts and Maine.  A naval skirmish near Sabine 
Pass that same month would result in the capture of hundreds of prisoners from the U.S.S. 
Morning Light and the U.S.S. Velocity.  From the Harriet Lane and the Morning Light, 
thirty-nine African American sailors were captured and took a different path to 
confinement than their white counterparts.  The Second Battle of Sabine Pass in September 
of 1863 would add dozens more soldiers and sailors from the U.S.S. Clifton and the U.S.S. 
Sachem to the prison in Hempstead.1   However, before reaching Camp Groce, all 
prisoners, black and white, passed through the prisoner of war compound in Houston, 
Texas.  Located in the downtown area on the banks of Buffalo Bayou, and always 
considered as a temporary facility, the two cotton warehouses that made up the compound 
were the oldest Civil War prison camp in Texas.  Today, a lone historical marker denotes 
the site that is mostly forgotten on land now occupied by the downtown campus of the 
University of Houston.  
It was during this first stop on the road to confinement that captured African 
American sailors and soldiers were separated from their fellow prisoners.  Instead of 
confinement, many blacks captured during the war were sold into slavery, or summarily 






Pass were transferred to the state penitentiary in Huntsville, Texas, enduring two years of 
hard labor until their release in June of 1865.   While on work detail in the city of Houston, 
black prisoners drew the attention of Houston mayor William Anders, who complained to 
Confederate commanders “the Yankee Negroes are now freely ambulating within our city” 
and “numerous complaints of our best citizens have been made to the authorities, and it 
seems that the whole community is alarmed.”  Anders primary concern seemed to be that 
their “most evil influence is exerted by those Negroes, who, most of them, are intelligent, 
shrewd and capable to read and write, and try to obtain a mastery over our slave 
population.”2 Despite experiencing their share of harsh treatment and desperate conditions, 
records show that only one African American Union prisoner died in Texas during the Civil 
War, 3rd Class sailor James Sashia of the USS Morning Light.3  
Camp Groce CSA – Hempstead, Texas 
 On a mostly flat creek bottom approximately two miles east of Hempstead, Texas, 
Camp Groce was established in June, 1863 as a Confederate prisoner of war camp to house 
the aforementioned Union soldiers and sailors captured at the Battle of Galveston and the 
naval engagements near Sabine Pass.   Originally established by the Texans as an 
instructional site for Confederate recruits in 1862, the camp was located on a portion of the 
Liendo Plantation, a sprawling three thousand plus acre farm owned by Leonard Waller 
Groce, who lived in a large, colonial style mansion built by slave labor in 1853, and located 
about a mile to the northeast of the camp.  Groce, who is often credited with bringing the 
first cotton gin to Texas in the 1820’s, was a former Colonel in the Texas army and an 






than a year after it opened, “Camp Liendo,” as it was called at the time, was abandoned by 
the Confederates after they realized the site was unsuitable for habitation.    
A few months later, the first Union prisoners arrived from Houston at the newly 
named Camp Groce.  Lieutenant Colonel Augustine J.H. Duganne of the 176th New York 
Infantry, who would also later spend time at Camp Ford, described the camp, upon arrival 
in the summer of 1863, as consisting only of “four stacks of barracks . . . built upon grounds 
a little higher  than the (nearby) railroad grade” with “another line of barracks running 
nearly parallel to ours, at a distance of one hundred yards or more” for the guards who were 
“under the command of a fat officer known as Captain Buster.”  The entirety of the camp 
was surrounded by “a tract of wild country, wood, swamp, and prairie, stretched for 
miles.”5  Duganne fails to mention any walls or other man-made barricades around the 
camp, and by all accounts there were none at this time.  As local authority Danial Lisarelli 
explains “with Camp Groce being in such an isolated location, the likelihood of escape was 
very small . . . sometimes they (the prisoners) were left almost unattended by the guards, 
especially when there was a race at the nearby fairgrounds.”6    
By early fall, the number of prisoners had swelled to over four hundred sailors, 
soldiers, and civilians, the latter being comprised of contract teamsters and those suspected 
of Yankee sympathies.  With only approximately two hundred Confederate soldiers of the 
4th Regiment of Texas State Troops to guard the camp, the decision was made to erect a 
wall in October of 1863.  Generally described as twelve feet high, with two gateways, 
catwalks and guard posts, the newly enclosed stockade comprised an estimated two and 
one half acres.7   Other accounts, such as that of Assistant Paymaster John Read, described 






perches, guards were instructed to “shoot any coming within an imaginary distance of ten 
feet of the fence.”8  Such a structure would have had a deleterious effect on the psyche of 
the captives as the camp-like atmosphere was stripped away, leaving in its place a stark 
reminder that one was in fact a prisoner.  During this first year of operation, Camp Groce 
was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Sayles and Major James W. Barnes.  
Colonel Charles C. Nott of the 176th New York Infantry described Sayles as “a man of few 
words, very quiet, very kind, and rarely gave an order that did not effect an improvement,” 
and Barnes as “a man of great general information, and so far as we were concerned, in 
every thought and word and deed a perfect Christian gentleman.”9  As many prisoners 
would discover in the coming year, the disposition and consideration of the camp 
commanders would have a lasting impact on the conditions of the camp, and the welfare 
of its unfortunate inhabitants. 
Less than two months later, Confederate Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, 
Commander of the Department of the Trans-Mississippi, issued an order for all prisoners 
to be transferred out of Camp Groce, and north to Tyler, Texas.   The enlisted men would 
soon thereafter be sent to Shreveport, Louisiana, and paroled.  The officers, however, were 
to remain in captivity at Camp Ford.10   During the brief respite between December 1863 
and May 1864, the stockade at Camp Groce remained a virtual ghost town.   The recess 
ended, however, after nearly six months when almost two hundred Yankees captured at the 
Battle of Calcasieu Pass, about half of which were sailors from the U.S.S. Granite City and 
the U.S.S. Wave, arrived in Hempstead.  Camp Groce was now under the control of a new 
commander, Colonel Clayton C. Gillespie of the 25th Texas Dismounted Cavalry, who John 






deteriorate, and the death rate would rise dramatically.  When five hundred additional 
prisoners arrived from Camp Ford in August of 1864, they found that those who had the 
misfortunate to be at Camp Groce over the prior four months were “half-naked . . . as they 
crawled about in the muddy, lice and flea-filled camp” while others “lay helpless in camp, 
covered in their own filth and no one willing or able to attend to them.”  Mosquitos were 
“breeding freely in the pit between the walls” and “the wells were filled with filth, 
rendering them useless.”12 For many, however, the worst was yet to come. 
In September of 1864, a yellow fever epidemic would force Camp Groce to be 
evacuated.  Over the next two months, over six hundred prisoners would be marched nearly 
fifty miles to makeshift camps appropriately named Camp Gillespie near Bellville, Texas, 
and Camp Felder near Chappel Hill, Texas.   At each camp, no shelter was provided for 
the prisoners.  At Camp Felder, numerous sheds were available for housing; however, 
Colonel Gillespie made the decision to shelter their horses in them instead.  This blatant 
disregard for human life typified the command of Gillespie, and created a dark image of 
him that would rival the worst tales of any prison commandant on either side.  Yankee 
prisoner, Acting Ensign Franklin J. Latham would later describe the suffering at Camp 
Felder:  “The daily number of deaths was 4 or 5, and when it rained 6 or 7.  The scene was 
horrible.  Living skeletons perishing, some with scarcely a rag to cover them; some insane 
yelling day and night till death relieved them; some anxiously clinging to life; others 
despairing and wishing they should die.”13  When the survivors had their homecoming at 
Camp Groce in November, one hundred twenty, or almost twenty percent, of the prisoners 






With conditions worsening, and the realization that they could no longer properly 
care for the remaining prisoners at Camp Groce becoming more apparent, the Trans-
Mississippi Department of the Confederacy was eager to arbitrate an exchange.  The 
negotiations, however, were hindered by the Confederacy’s reluctance to trade Yankee 
sailors for Confederate soldiers, instead of Confederate sailors.  Unlike the ongoing issue 
of the Confederacy not wanting to exchange black prisoners for white soldiers, the issue of 
soldiers for sailors could be resolved in the spirit of the old exchange system when the right 
personnel became available.  After several months, a compromise was reached in which 
the soldiers at Camp Groce would be exchanged for Confederate soldiers captured at Fort 
Gaines, Alabama, and the Union sailors would be exchanged for members of the 
Confederate Navy captured at Mobile Bay, Alabama.   On December 2, 1864, news of the 
pending parole and exchange reached Camp Groce.15  Within three weeks, the camp would 
be empty. 
Camp Ford, CSA – Tyler, Texas 
 Known as Camp Hubbard, Box Springs Camp, Gum Springs Campground, Pine 
Springs, and simply the “camp at a spring northeast of Tyler on the Marshall Road,” the 
area later known as Camp Ford was established in 1862 as a training camp for Confederate 
conscripts, before becoming a prisoner of war camp in July of 1863.  Unlike Hempstead, 
the nearest town to Camp Groce, Tyler, Texas, was a significant manufacturing and 
administrative center for the Confederate army of the Trans-Mississippi Department.  The 
Tyler Ordnance Works was the largest producer of small arms ammunition for the 
Confederacy west of the Mississippi River, producing over 2.6 million rounds between 






laboratory located at Headache Springs three miles east of Tyler produced herbal medicines 
and whiskey, packaged with Confederate States’ labels.  Saddles, wagons, and harnesses 
were made at the Quartermaster Depot just outside of Tyler.  With an extensive military 
presence, and an abundance of accessible supplies, Tyler was an obvious alternative to the 
make-shift facilities temporarily housing prisoners in Shreveport, Louisiana.16   
The camp was named for Confederate Colonel John Salmon “Rip” Ford, somewhat 
of a frontier Renaissance man, who practiced medicine, studied the law, ran a newspaper 
in Austin, was elected to the Texas legislature, served as a Texas Ranger, and fought in 
both the Texas Revolution and the Mexican-American War.  In May of 1865, he would 
lead his troops to victory at the Battle of Palmito Ranch, generally regarded as the last 
battle of the Civil War; but for now, he was assigned the task of training new recruits at 
the camp that would soon bear his name.17  The first Union prisoners began arriving at 
Camp Ford, which was now under the command of Captain Stanley M. Warner, in the 
latter part of July, 1863.   Little is known of Captain Warner’s career, or his short-lived 
command at the camp.  Guilty of an action “being so flagrant, requiring immediate action, 
and it being impractical to order a General Court Martial,” Captain Warner was demoted, 
conscripted, and generally lost to history.18   
Between July and October, 1863, Camp Ford housed less than fifty Union prisoners 
in an open area with no barricades.  A local woman, Mittie Marsh, complained to her 
husband in an August 30, 1863, letter:  “the yanks do just as they please I think, three of 
them came here last evening . . . in search of something good to eat.”  In November, 1863, 
over four hundred fifty new prisoners, being a mix of Union sailors from the U.S.S. Queen 






during the Bayou Teche Campaign, were introduced to the camp.   With a prison population 
of approximately five hundred Yankees now being guarded by less than eighty Confederate 
militia, the locals’ fear of calamity increased dramatically. With obvious concern, Mittie 
Marsh explained “all of the Yankey prisoners were about to make their escape . . . going 
to unarm the guard and go from camps to Tyler . . . get plenty of guns and ammunition and 
horses . . . and take the negroes and all leave but fortunately their plan was discovered.”19  
In a November 15, 1863, letter to her son, Sarah Carter feared the Yankees “have threatened 
to run over the guards, seize their arms and kill without regard to age or sex.”20  Kate Stone, 
a refugee from Louisiana who compiled one of the most well-known journals of the Civil 
War by a Southern woman, lamented “a number of prisoners escaped the other day, and 
the townspeople are very apprehensive of their burning the town . . . alone as we are tonight, 
I feel a little afraid of the escaped Yankees.”21  With growing concerns, the decision was 
made in late 1863 to erect a stockade around the camp, built primarily by local slaves 
volunteered by their anxious owners.  Captain John W. Greene of the 26th Indiana Infantry 
would in the post-war years sarcastically decry the necessity of such a wall to confine 
prisoners who were so far from home, “in about ten days their work was completed . . . and 
with the unarmed prisoners now securely confined, the people of Tyler were relieved of 
their fear.”22  In an ironic twist of fate, Captain Greene and his fellow soldier, Lieutenant 
John A. Whitsit, would successfully escape from Camp Ford on Christmas Eve, 1863, 
while on a work detail outside of the stockade to gather wood.   
With stockade walls estimated from fifteen to twenty feet high, and encompassing 
approximately four acres, upon initial inspection Camp Ford would have looked very 






Camp Ford was comprised of ten-foot long cabins for officers, with smaller A-shaped 
structures called “shebangs” for the enlisted men.  Upon Colonel Duganne’s arrival, he 
promptly hired two Kansas prisoners for one hundred Confederate dollars to “rear me a 
palatial mansion twelve feet by ten inside, with a good stone fire-place, and a substantial 
clay chimney.”23  While nearby forests supplied a considerable amount of wood for 
construction and campfires, perhaps the most significant feature of the camp was a flowing 
spring, diverted into separate reservoirs for drinking and bathing.  Captain Amos Johnson, 
the self-appointed “Commissioner of Aqueducts,” maintained the reservoirs and insured 
the availability of a healthy water supply.  In early 1864, Union officers laid out the plans 
for what came to be known as “Ford City,” a town within the stockade comprised of named 
streets, a camp mess, workshops, a bakery, and even a public square.24 
Throughout the early portion of its existence as a prisoner of war facility, Camp 
Ford was under the command of Colonel Robert T.P. Allen of the 17th Texas Infantry.   A 
military instructor and Methodist minister prior to the war, Allen was described as kind, 
liberal in his discipline, and was said to have “never doubted the honor of his prisoners.”   
In May of 1864, he was replaced by Colonel Thomas Scott Anderson, who was almost his 
polar opposite.  An attorney and Texas Secretary of State prior to the conflict, Anderson 
was characterized as “a bitter secessionist, of the demonstrative sort” who “speedily 
contrived to become obnoxious to many Federal officers and men.”25  He encouraged the 
guards to shoot any prisoners who cursed at them, attempted to escape, or just wandered 
too close to the barricade, and would allow atrocities to occur under Lieutenant B.W. 






In the Spring of 1864, the Union began its Red River Campaign to destroy the 
Confederate army of Lieutenant General Richard Taylor in Louisiana, capture Shreveport, 
rally pro-Union locals, and sever Texas from the rest of the Confederacy.  Despite being 
outnumbered two to one, and at times as much as five to one, the Rebels would win a series 
of battles across Louisiana, thwarting Union objectives and capturing thousands of Yankee 
prisoners along the way.  In April of 1864, an influx of over 4,000 prisoners from the 
Battles of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill swelled the population of Camp Ford to dangerous 
levels.  On April 15th, Kate Stone confirmed “three thousand prisoners will arrive here 
tonight to be guarded with their companions in misery at the conscript camp.”26  
Overcrowding placed an undue burden on the availability of supplies, and physical space, 
resulting in a lack of adequate housing, starvation, and unsanitary conditions.  Enlarging 
the stockade did little to alleviate the suffering.  Writing years later of the conditions, 
Colonel Nott said “our number swelled from a hundred officers, to forty-seven hundred 
and twenty-five officers, soldiers and sailors . . . then followed a quarter of a year of 
loathsome wretchedness, beside which, the squalor and vice of a great city’s worst haunts 
appeared . . . the healthy character of our camp changed in a single week.”   He further 
lamented “the friendless sick lay shelterless on the ground around us” and “we walk over 
the dying and the dead, whenever we moved, and saw and heard their miseries through 
every hour.”27  Confederate Surgeon F.W. Meagher would confirm in a June 1864 report 
on the overcrowding in the camp, “the enclosed ground is entirely too small for the number 
of men . . . and it would be impossible to make them healthy in such a crowded condition 
. . . the filth and offal” creates a “horrible stench” while “a great number of the enlisted 






to cover them.”28  On June 14th, Kate Stone would make one last comment on the condition 
of the camp, “the prisoners are in a most pitiable condition, perfectly destitute.  Some have 
only a blanket to wear and others only one garment.  There is much sickness and death 
among them and the authorities are powerless to get clothes for them.”29 
 In late April of 1865, news of General Robert E. Lee’s surrender at 
Appomattox finally reached Camp Ford.  Despite an increase in escape attempts, and the 
inevitable ending of hostilities, the camp continued to operate.  On the night of May 14, 
1865, the majority of the guards abandoned their posts, and the prisoners awoke the next 
morning to find the gates open.  Due to chaos and looting in Tyler, and with the expectation 
that an official parole would soon be realized, most of the prisoners remained in the 
stockade for their own protection, but ventured freely outside of its walls when they so 
desired.  Sergeant Arthur E. Gilligan of the 8th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry would 
record in his diary on May 15, 1865, “the guards have all deserted, but Sweets men and 
they are all drunk, Officers and all. In the evening the band got together and went to 
headquarters and Played to the Rebs and our officers. The whiskey was passed around and 
I partook Freely.”30  On May 17, 1865, the last remaining prisoners left Camp Ford for 
Shreveport and freedom.31  Sergeant Gilligan likely spoke for most prisoners heading north 
when he wrote “today we . . . crossed the Texas line.  I hope I shall never have an occasion 
to cross it again.”32  At least one prisoner, however, the well-written Colonel Duganne, 
would look back on his years at Camp Ford with fondness “the bond of mutual loyalty – 
the golden link of patriotism – will be brightened when we shall look back upon Camp 
Ford, by beams of Friendship, Love, Trust – and that greatest of all which is Charity.”33  






stockade.  Years later, he would recall “I will not attempt to describe my feelings as the 
final exit was made; suffice it to say that it was one of the happiest moments of my life.”34 
Comparison of Death Rates between Camp Groce and Camp Ford 
 The stark contrast between Camp Groce and Camp Ford can be seen in the writings 
and personal accounts of those who were there, but can also be found in the raw statistical 
data of survival in the two camps.  Confederate records are notoriously incomplete; 
however, extensive research by Danial Lisarelli has established accepted prisoner numbers 
for Camp Groce.  During the first period of confinement in Camp Groce in 1863, 20 of the 
known 427 prisoners died, for a death rate of 4.68%.  However, when conditions and 
command changed at the camp during the second period in 1864, the death rate jumped 
dramatically to 29.6%, as 201 of the known 678 prisoners perished.  Combined, both years 
give Camp Groce a death rate of 20.0% (221 deaths out of 1,105 total prisoners), which is 
comparable to the rates seen at Andersonville and Elmira, generally regarded as two of the 
deadliest camps in the east.35  What changed between the short one year period from 1863 
to 1864?  What factors lead to an almost 530% increase in the death rate?   
 In comparison, while the prisoner numbers at Camp Ford have never been 
conclusively determined, consensus is that between 232 and 286 prisoners died out of an 
estimated 6,000 total inhabitants, for a death rate of approximately 3.86% to 4.78%.   From 
this group, an estimated 183 prisoners passed away during the period of May to October, 
1864, when the population was at its highest, being 63.98% to 78.89% of the total number 
of deaths in the camp.36  With a command structure and outward appearance so similar to 






War prison in the country?  What conditions lead to the dramatic increase in deaths for the 




























  Five Factors - Survival in Texas 
 To begin understanding why the death rates at Camp Groce and Camp Ford were 
so different from one another, we will now turn our attention to the five factors discussed 
in Chapter One, being:  natural environment, non-natural environment, camp commanders, 
imprisoned officers, and activities available.  In analyzing the Texas camps, we will 
address each factor in the order given; however, in our later discussions of Elmira and 
Andersonville, the factors will be addressed in the order in which they seem most 
appropriate to the overall discussion of each camp.  Not all camps are the same, and 
consequently we will see that each factor did not necessarily have the same effect, whether 
positively or negatively, on the prisoners in each facility. 
Effect of the Natural Environment 
 Naturalist John Muir once said “In every walk with nature, one receives far more 
than he seeks.”  While many would accept this quote as a positive expression, Muir does 
not say that what one receives from nature is always welcome, only that it is more than one 
expects to find.  Nature is life, but it is also death.   In the nineteenth century, man depended 
on his natural surroundings for survival, even more so than we do today.  Lack of a fresh 
water supply could lead a homesteader, or an entire town, to extinction.  Failure to 
understand weather cycles, soil conditions and natural predators could cause the loss of 
one’s food supply, and certain death.  Civil War soldiers on both sides, who cleared timber 
for fortifications and shelter, and who foraged for food outside of their allotted rations, 






defines nature/natural environment as “non-human, non-manmade ecological, 
meteorological, and topographical phenomena, including the related set of weather, 
seasons, and climate, as well as air, water, terrain, insects, animals, and plant life.”1  In 
general terms, environmental history is the “study of the changing relationships human 
communities develop with nonhuman nature over time and place.”  Consequently, 
environmental histories of the Civil War then must examine “nature’s active role in the 
conflict as well as the war’s effects on both ecological systems and American’s 
relationships with the natural environment.”2  Man’s very survival is affected by the natural 
environment around him, but the way he uses nature to his advantage will also impact the 
environment not only for himself, but others as well, including potentially generations yet 
to come.  This is certainly the case for Civil War soldiers whether in the field or as a 
prisoner of war.  In examining the effects of the natural environment on a POW’s chance 
of survival, I will follow the definition laid out by Meier, with an appreciation of the role 
of environmental history, to establish parameters for the analysis.  Nature would present 
itself as a vital part of the lives of those at Camp Groce and Camp Ford in distinctive ways 
that had a direct effect on the rate of survival.  Prisoners learned through self-care to use 
nature to their advantage whenever possible, but were also acutely aware of the 
disadvantages that nature could impose on their very survival.  
 Despite the area of Camp Groce being deemed unsuitable for the training and 
quartering of their own soldiers, the Confederates did not have any such reservations in 
using the site for the housing of prisoners.  The nearby creek, which ironically today is 
called Clear Creek, was described as sluggish, stagnant, muddy, and generally unfit for 






of drinking water.  Two wells were located within the campsite; however, by the time the 
site reopened in 1864, the only well inside the stockade had caved in.  After the war, in 
hearings before Congress, John Read testified that access to the creek was often denied, 
leaving “at early morn . . . a rush to get what water had oozed into the old well through the 
night, and this being very little, many sick men suffered for water to cool their parched 
lips.”3  Exposure to the contaminated water caused dysentery, and the low lying area near 
the creek became a breeding ground for mosquitos, which undoubtedly contributed to the 
yellow fever epidemic in 1864. 
 In contrast, the lack of fresh water at Camp Ford was rarely, if ever, an issue of 
concern.  The spring that flowed through the camp was described by one prisoner as “a 
wonderful one . . . it gushes out of the clay-bank, cool and crystalline . . . it is impregnated 
with iron and sulphur, and the water is a perpetual tonic.”4  While the enthusiasm of this 
soldier may be attributed to the fondness of post-war memories, the source of water was 
certainly an asset to the camp, and one that received very little criticism either in 
recollections or accounts from the time.  Care was also taken by the prisoners at Camp Ford 
to maintain the quality of the water.  Colonel Duganne proudly remembered “we have 
several wooden reservoirs, to which the prisoners resort for washing purposes.  The upper 
one contains our drinking water.  It threatened failure once, but Northern ingenuity sank 
the reservoirs and guarantied perennial supplies.”5  By all accounts, the quality and 
availability of fresh water did not diminish during the period of captivity, as the stream 
remained a reliable source.  While dysentery did afflict a number of prisoners at Camp 
Ford, those suffering from it never reached the levels seen at Camp Groce, despite the 






spring flowing directly through the camp was an obvious environmental advantage for the 
inhabitants of Camp Ford over their counterparts at Camp Groce.  However, their proactive 
measure to insure the quality of the water via a series of constructed reservoirs 
demonstrates how the prisoners at Camp Ford practiced self-care to turn the existing natural 
element to their long-term advantage. 
 The countryside surrounding Camp Groce was part prairie, part swamp, with groves 
of trees and thickets throughout, but not of the quantity that would lead one to call it a 
forest.  Corporal Aaron T. Sutton of the 83rd Ohio Volunteer Infantry would characterize it 
as “generally poor; yellow sand mostly.”6  In 1863, prisoners were frequently allowed to 
venture into the surrounding area to cut wood, gather clay, and forage for whatever they 
believed was edible, or had medicinal value.  Quantity was almost always in short supply.  
One item that was readily available, however, was the leaves of a half bush, half tree, that 
the prisoners called yapon or yippun (today it is known as yaupon).  It grew in large 
quantities near the creek and up to the borders of the camp, and was made into a tea “which 
was said to taste wonderfully.”  One soldier admitted, however, that “it was said that it 
caused certain unpleasant medical effects, and one young gentleman, who had once taken 
a mug full, averred that he shortly thereafter felt a burning sensation in that part of his body 
where he supposed (erroneously) was his stomach.”7   Yet another found it to be “an 
excellent substitute for tea . . . how luxuriously it titillated my palate.”8  Being a species of 
holly used primarily by Native Americans in purification rituals, yaupon contained 
caffeine, had no substantial nutritional value, and was known to induce vomiting (hence 
it’s Latin name Ilex Vomitoria).  It’s use likely had more of a detrimental, rather than a 






medicinal tea that may have reminded one of home, yaupon contributed to the improved 
mental health of those who regularly drank it. When one did venture outside of the camp 
in the early months of operation, whether looking for yaupon or other “necessities,” they 
had to avoid “copperheads, rattlesnakes and hooded vipers” which inhabited the “swampy 
neighborhoods of Camp Groce.”9  In 1864, when Colonel Gillespie obtained command of 
the camp, prisoner treks outside of the stockade were restricted, and eventually stopped all 
together.  Unable to supplement their meager rations, or gather wood to be used for shelter 
and campfires, the prisoners suffered, both mentally and physically, and the conditions 
within the camp quickly worsened. 
 Camp Ford was located on a hilly Texas prairie, in close proximity to forests of 
pine, ash, hickory, and hollywood.  In addition to the spring running through the stockade, 
Ray’s Creek flowed freely to the southeast of the camp.  Access to the surrounding area 
was allowed throughout the life of the camp, especially in 1863, and early 1864, while 
under the command of Colonel Allen.  With such access, usually under supervision of the 
guards, the prisoners were able to gather enough timber to construct the log cabins and 
mess halls that improved the quality of life, and became a lasting characteristic of Camp 
Ford.  As the number of escape attempts increased, foraging parties were more limited, and 
under a heavier guard detail, but still continued.  Wild hogs, foxes, deer and rabbits roamed 
the surrounding area, providing an occasional supplement to the rationed diet of the 
prisoners.  With convenient access to water, supplies, and fertile soil, gardens of “corn, rye, 
lettuce, sweet potatoes, water-melons, beans, peas, cabbages, and red peppers” were 
planted.10  Captain William McKinney of the 19th Kentucky Infantry would in a May 1864 






arrival.”11  With the dramatic increase in population in 1864, food and supplies were in 
shorter supply, but still, when the population was paroled in 1865, there were gardens 
remaining, yet to be harvested.  This level of access to the outside world was unparalleled 
among Civil War prisoner of war camps.  By taking full advantage of what nature provided, 
and the opportunities presented by their keepers, the inmates at Camp Ford improved their 
chance of survival by doing the simple things they would have likely done at home: 
hunting, foraging, and farming. 
 While the area around Camp Ford was not plagued by the number of deadly snakes 
that frequented Camp Groce, the prisoners near Tyler were afflicted by centipedes, 
scorpions and tarantulas.  According to one account, a soldier died from a tarantula bite on 
his neck that “swelled tumorously.”12  Lice, rats and other vermin were prevalent at both 
sites throughout.  Even under the best of conditions, there were constant reminders that 
nature could be harsh and detrimental to one’s health. 
 Both camps suffered from the Texas heat, and occasional winter cold snap, with 
few distinctions.  Those serving at Camp Ford did enjoy slightly less humid conditions and 
more seasonable weather in the Piney Woods, than their counterparts at Camp Groce who 
labored a little more than a hundred miles from the Gulf Coast.  However, the effect of the 
weather on the differing conditions of both camps was not a significant factor.  Prisoners 
writing about their time at either camp do mention the weather, especially the heat, 
throughout their commentary and recollections; however, it is never presented as a primary 
concern.  This may be due to the fact that, except for a few brief periods, shelter was 
available at both camps to provide some relief from the elements.  The one major exception 






the heavy rains of a Texas Fall, while the Rebel horses remained warm and dry nearby.  As 
they made their way slowly back to Camp Groce from the makeshift Camp Felder, the 
prisoners were forced to march over muddy roads that were impassable to the wagons, 
“here and there one would find a prisoner stuck in the mud, nearly naked, sick with fever 
and dysentery, trembling in the cold November rain.”13  As historian Lisa M. Brady points 
out in her 2012 article “From Battlefield to Fertile Ground: The Development of Civil War 
Environmental History,” the necessity of large armies by both sides “accelerated the 
development of diseases that thrive on human hosts,” due to the fact that “war represents 
not only a breakdown of human social and political relations but also the disintegration of 
the existing environmental order.”14  Once the advantageous elements of the environment 
are either exhausted or otherwise no longer available, prisoners of war must rely on the 
existing social order for survival.  If that deteriorates, as Brady suggests it often does in 
war, then one is left only with self-preservation in a chaotic environment.  As we will see 
in our later discussion of the prison at Andersonville, a near complete collapse of the 
environmental and social order lead to rapid decline in both physical and mental health, 
and consequently death on an enormous scale. 
Effect of the Local, Non-Natural Environment 
 Like many Civil War prisoner of war sites, both Camp Groce and Camp Ford were 
located in close proximity to a thriving civilian community.  The interactions that the 
captives would have with the local citizens, would have a lasting, positive effect on their 
morale, physical well-being, and rate of survival.  The cessation of such interactions at 
Camp Groce would have an equally negative effect as well. Townspeople, whether ardent 






in commerce with the prisoners, provided medical services, brought religion to the camps, 
and, in the case of Camp Ford, visited solely as a social call.  Regardless of their reasons 
for interaction, the role played by locals had a significant impact on life in the camps. 
 Hempstead, Texas, was founded in 1856, at the projected stopping point of the 
Houston and Texas Central Railway.  Linked directly to Houston and the Gulf Coast by 
rail, Hempstead would become a commercial hub, as well as a distribution center for goods 
heading north and west into the interior of Texas.  When Camp Groce opened in 1863, the 
citizens of Hempstead wasted little time in initiating commerce with the prisoners.  
Allowed by camp commander Major Barnes to trade in Confederate currency, the Yankees 
“procured Java coffee at $10 the pound . . . tea at $20.00 the pound, molasses at $5.00 the 
gallon, and vinegar at fifty cents,” and could occasionally purchase “sweet potatoes, eggs, 
butter, milk and poultry, at comparatively reasonable prices.” 15  A Union lieutenant was 
so pleased with the commerce allowed by his captors that he wrote to his superiors, 
requesting they offer the same treatment to their prisoners, “they have furnished us on our 
credit the currency of the country sufficient for our wants (our money not being allowed to 
circulate) have sent us books and papers, and have procured for us all the comforts the 
country affords, that our situation permits us to enjoy.”16  While it is not unusual for locals 
to have engaged in commerce with prisoners at the various camps throughout America, the 
frequency and quality of the business being conducted at Camp Groce exceeded the norms.  
Whether or not the citizens of Hempstead traded so frequently with the prisoners out of a 
sense of guilt, or just a desire for profit, is undeterminable.  Accounts of the trading are 
decidedly one-sided and come almost in their entirety from the letters, journals, and post-






the citizens of Hempstead during this period remain elusive to historical researchers, and 
the only local newspaper in existence at the start of the conflict, the Hempstead Courier, 
appears to have ceased publication prior to the opening of the camp in 1863.  When the site 
was preparing for evacuation to Camp Ford in December of 1863, prisoners were 
encouraged to sell as much of their possessions as possible in order to eliminate 
encumbrances for the march, leaving one to imagine how much property at least some of 
the prisoners had been able to acquire.  Having somewhat of a “Groce garage sale,” Colonel 
Duganne described the subsequent flurry of sales “the rebel guards, with outside customers, 
were anxious to relieve the Yankees of any superfluous clothing or other articles . . . our 
sailors and soldiers displayed their goods upon the sand, while rebels clustered eagerly . . 
. to cheapen and buy at bargains whatever was exposed for sale.”17  While Camp Groce did 
occasionally get local visitors who were just curious to see a Yankee, the overwhelming 
majority visiting in 1863 were there to engage in commerce. 
 During this first year of captivity near Hempstead, while Confederate records were 
not regularly kept, it is known that medical services were provided.  Imprisoned Union 
Surgeon J.W. Sherfy shared duties with a Doctor Roberts of the Confederate service.  
Described by a prisoner as “excellent and faithful surgeons,” they maintained an office 
outside of the stockade and visited the prisoners twice daily, distributing prescriptions in 
the evening.18  When a small hospital constructed within the walls of the stockade proved 
to be deficient, a portion of the old Hempstead Hotel was commandeered for a second 
hospital for sick prisoners and guards alike.  The hotel hospital was operated by a Northern 
woman, who openly wore a “star and stripes” pin while performing her duties, and touched 






and Rebels, as she performed “her duties as a Christian woman . . . in a spirit of kindliness 
that is worth more than medicine.”19 
 Shortly after their arrival at Camp Groce in 1863, the Union prisoners were 
informed that religious services would be regularly provided, just outside of the walls of 
the stockade, by Andrew Jackson McGown, a Presbyterian minister and former soldier in 
the Texas Revolution.  As one captive fondly recalled of Reverend McGown, “he visited 
us in our quarters, ministered to our sick, and was always one of our most welcome 
visitors.”20  Although there is no record of any ministers officiating at the funerals of lost 
prisoners, services were performed by their fellow captives, with mention of at least one 
funeral being attended by local citizens.  When Ariel Ives Cummings, Surgeon of the 42nd 
Massachusetts Regiment and a Freemason, passed away on September 9, 1863, the good 
doctor was laid to rest with a ceremony attended by Masons, both from Camp Groce 
(prisoners and guards) and from the local community, that included all of the ritual 
clothing, practices, and accompaniments expected of the organization.21  This extraordinary 
show of support from local citizens in honoring a fellow Freemason furthered the impact 
that personal interaction had on the mental health of the prisoners.  Being so far from home, 
in conditions that were unimaginable prior to the war, prisoners on both sides took solace 
from the smallest acts of compassion, contrition, empathy, and comradery that they 
received from their captors and those they encountered in their new environments.     
 Despite the Spartan conditions at Camp Groce, morale was high in 1863.  The 
freedom to improve their conditions, and socialize with the locals, made an expectedly bad 
situation more acceptable.  “We were our own masters, to a great extent, being allowed to 






or gossiped by the fire, like favored guests in the rural districts” recalled Colonel 
Duganne.22  This freedom, and the benefits received from it, both physical and mental, 
would dramatically change when the camp re-opened its wooden doors in 1864.  With a 
new commander came new rules, all to the detriment of the prisoners.  Local merchants 
were no longer allowed to sell food and other supplies to the detainees.  Prisoners were 
denied access to the nearby creek.  The lone Union doctor in the camp was prevented from 
leaving the stockade to forage for medicinal herbs and barks.  The Confederate doctor that 
tended to the camp in 1863 was gone, leaving only a local physician “who usually was too 
intoxicated to stand alone.”  With rebel soldiers occupying most of the beds at the 
Hempstead Hotel, a new hospital was designated for the Yankees in the attic of an old 
church, accessible only by a rotten ladder that lead to the death of “one poor fellow” who 
“fell in his weakness and was killed, having broken his neck.”  John Read would later 
testify of the condition of the new hospital “this room, packed closely with men low with 
diarrhea and the most loathsome diseases, lying in their own filth, left to care for 
themselves, soon became a place of corruption” as “those dying were robbed of their 
clothes, and carried out, many at a time, in mule carts, and buried on the prairies.”23   During 
this final year of Camp Groce, prisoner morale would deteriorate, and the death rate would 
increase more than five-fold.  Some of this misery can admittedly be attributed to the 
yellow fever epidemic that swept the camp in 1864.  However, the malnutrition, lack of 
access to medical care, low morale, and poor treatment while on the trek away from Camp 
Groce to avoid the fever, certainly added to the severity of the epidemic and the rising 






prevailed at any time more than that endangered by filth and neglect . . . the prisoners died 
victims to low and short diet, neglect, exposure, and abuse.”24 
 To the northeast, Tyler, Texas, was founded in 1846 as the county seat of Smith 
County, and soon became a leading commercial and shipping hub for the region.  Already 
the site of an arsenal, supply depot, and regional headquarters for the Trans-Mississippi 
Department of the Confederacy, Tyler was an obvious site for a prisoner of war camp as 
well.  The citizens of Tyler, however, were not immediately accepting of their newfound 
Yankee neighbors.  Diarist Kate Stone found the Yankee prisoners to be “detestable 
creatures . . . impudent too . . . it does seem like they ought to be hanged.”25  A local guard, 
Elbert Williams, expressed his displeasure in an 1863 letter “theay are the sorriest looking 
men I ever saw in all my life . . . theay look dirty and lousey.  I don’t like their looks a bit.  
I had no talk for them – they look too mean.”26  After the panic over a mass escape subsided 
with the construction of the stockade in November, 1863, the residents of Tyler warmed 
up to the Camp Ford prisoners, seeing them as a source of commerce, social amusement, 
and perhaps even romance. 
 Commerce in and out of Camp Ford flowed freely in 1863, and even into the 
overcrowded period of 1864.  As in the early days at Camp Groce, local merchants 
frequently visited the camp to sell produce and other basic supplies.  However, unlike at 
Camp Groce, certain prisoners were also allowed to leave the stockade, unguarded.  Union 
officers were granted one day paroles to go into Tyler and the surrounding area to purchase 
or trade for necessities.  On one such trip in 1863, Colonel Nott and a fellow officer 
acquired a pumpkin, sweet potatoes, dried peaches, cider vinegar, eggs, a chicken, and 






dinner for fourteen men, complete with waiters.27  Industrious prisoners at Camp Ford were 
soon turning out an extraordinary amount of products for sale or trade to the locals.  A 
partial list gathered from various sources includes axe handles, baskets, candles, chairs, 
chessmen, crockery, cigars, straw hats, musical instruments, pipes, rings, soap, tables, toy 
boxes, wooden utensils and plates, wash boards, combs, dominoes, dice, checkers, sleeve 
buttons, door mats and salt cellars!  Such production, not only in quantity but also in 
diversity, was uncommon in Confederate prisoner of war camps, and puts Camp Ford in 
comparison to its much more densely populated counterparts in the east, such as Elmira 
prison in New York, where items being produced were in such demand that they “attracted 
mail orders from friends north and south.”28  It is important to note, however, that there is 
no evidence that the commerce being conducted in and around Camp Ford had any 
significant impact on the local economy.  While it is certainly true that a few local 
merchants and farmers profited from trade with the prisoners, such commerce had been 
regularly conducted with the substantial Confederate military presence already in the area 
prior to the opening of the prison.  The output of products being generated by the Yankees 
was impressive in both quantity and diversity; however, the volume was affected by the 
limited resources available.  At no point during the tenure of Camp Ford is there evidence 
that the inmates enjoyed a monopoly over any particular product, or that they affected the 
supply and demand for such items in any significant way. 
 While only a few fell under suspicion in Hempstead, Tyler appeared to have a fair 
number of Union sympathizers throughout the area.  Kept in a small log cabin called the 
“wolf pen” just outside of Camp Ford until their eventual transfers and trials, suspected 






in order to get sent to the same confinement.  Prominent local citizens George W. 
Whitmore, a former state legislator, and George Rosenbaum, a former district attorney, 
were suspected of conspiring with the Union, and were housed at Camp Ford for nearly 
eight months before being released in November, 1864. They were admirably described by 
one prisoner as “noble-hearted Texans, who refused to bow the knee to (Jefferson) 
Davis.”29   Others suspected of sympathizing did not fare so well.  Kate Stone recorded on 
May 18, 1864, “There was a terrible tragedy enacted here today. Three men, noted 
Jayhawkers, were taken out of the jail and just out of town and hanged by mob law. It is 
horrible and makes on shudder to think of it, though it is said they richly deserved their 
fate.”30 
 The medical treatment provided at Camp Ford was, by all accounts, superior to that 
experienced at Camp Groce.  Even during the period of overcrowding, when disease and 
unsanitary conditions were common, the death rate remained low.  Hoping to quell a small 
pox outbreak in March of 1864, a hospital was constructed just outside of the stockade in 
order to quarantine those infected.  Under the care of yet another drunk Confederate doctor, 
many prisoners who had not been previously vaccinated, died nonetheless.  Seeing the need 
for improved care, a second hospital was built in the summer of 1864, and was manned by 
Union volunteers with prior medical experience.  Despite free flow of commerce in and 
around the camp, the hospital was woefully low on sanitary supplies, medicine, and 
nutrition.  In addition to small pox and the seemingly ever present dysentery, prisoners 
commonly suffered from scurvy, “sore eyes, a condition most likely brought on by Vitamin 
A deficiency and manifested by sudden temporary blindness lasting several days,” and the 






of war camps in both the North and the South, food rations, clothing, and medicines of all 
kinds were almost always in short supply.  Officially, food and most other supplies were 
provided and paid for by the respective Union and Confederate governments, although as 
we have seen, diets were supplemented by foraging, trading, and other means of self-care.  
Shortages, and who was to blame, have been a favorite topic of Civil War historians for 
decades, with little room for agreement between Southern apologists, Northern supporters, 
and those who seek common ground for the truth.  As previously discussed, the 
historiography of Civil War POW camps needs to move beyond the basic elements that are 
common to almost all camps, and the blame/excuses that seem to accompany them, and 
instead develop a more objective and critical analysis of specific conditions and what really 
differentiated one camp from another. 
 While there are very few accounts of locals visiting Camp Groce for purely social 
reasons, Camp Ford had an overabundance of visitors, especially the ladies of the 
community, who frequented the camp for social, humanitarian, and by some accounts, 
romantic interests.  While some visitors certainly made their way to Camp Ford just to “see 
a Yankee,” many of the ladies in the community of Tyler took an active interest in the 
foreign invaders.  Most were brought to the site by Mrs. Allen, the wife of the camp 
commander, Colonel Allen, and were entertained with conversation, music, dancing, and 
poetry readings by the Union prisoners.  At least one prisoner suspected there was a number 
of “loyal Union dames and maidens among them too; as we discovered from time to time.”  
As a Yankee fiddler, Captain May, played “Sounds from Home,” the music would “draw 
the tears from eyes of the rebel ladies.”32  Officers allowed to leave the camp on temporary 






Riley Tunnel lamented that the prisoners were allowed too much liberty and that Union 
officers departed from “the camp almost at will . . . occasionally they returned with 
bouquets.”   Perhaps showing a hint of jealousy, he continued “several of the Tyler belles 
visited the officers with gifts of flowers and sweetmeats . . . one of the officers had a flair 
for poetry and traded poems with several of the young ladies of Tyler.”33  Yet another guard, 
Mart Fraley, expressed, in a letter to his cousin in November of 1863, concern and distaste 
for the attention paid to the prisoners “ther is some fine looking women in this country as 
any you ever saw in life.  But I cant keep from hating them to save me.  They think they ar 
plum abuse a soldier and they will sell those infernal yanks anything before they will us.  I 
rather think if I stay her much longer I shall be outs with all the women . . . one mile from 
this place where ther is two verry fine looking girls and one of them is engaged to a yankey 
prisoner her.”34 
 Both Colonel Nott and Colonel Duganne in their post-war writings make mention 
of one special visitor to the camp, local poetess Mollie Moore.   Described by Nott as “one 
of those girls men are a little afraid of, and that other girls do not like,” she became a 
favorite of the prisoners, despite her staunch rebel sympathies.  A Lieutenant Pearson took 
a special interest in Ms. Moore and begged her for autographs and copies of poems, which 
was answered with a disapproving letter that she later said she could not resist the 
temptation to write.35  Colonel Duganne also took an interest in Mollie, frequently trading 
poetry with her, sparring over her rebel devotion, and writing several pages about her in 
his post-war accounts.  Describing the “Texan Sappho” as “a young, sharp, self-possessed, 
pale-faced, Jane Eyre sort . . . whose thin lips could curl with bitterness, and whose pale-






the camp, were certainly impressed, if not taken, by the Southern poet.36  Post-war, Mollie 
would have a long career as a poet and newspaper editor, and would marry a Confederate 
veteran, Major Thomas Edward Davis, in 1874. 
 Camp Ford, like all prisoner of war sites, certainly had its share of death, misery 
and despair; however, its inhabitants also enjoyed a level of social interaction with the 
civilians of the area that was unheard of in most Civil War camps.  Guard David Thomas 
Phanes, in a letter to his wife, Mary, in August, 1863, believed that many of the prisoners 
were content in saying “I understand that some of them says that they are willing to stay 
here until peace is made.”37  Conditions changed, of course, when the population of the 
camp swelled the next year, and Colonel Allen was replaced as commander.  The departure 
of Colonel Allen also meant the departure of his wife, and thus there were few, if any, 
subsequent visits from the local ladies.  The crowded conditions “deprived” Camp Ford 
“of the country-village characteristics which formerly distinguished it,” as it became “a 
community of strangers to one another.”38  Interactions with the outside world create a 
connection with the homes they left behind, and aid in improving the mental well-being of 
the prisoners.  Conversely, losing contact with those outside of the camp created an ever-
increasing sense of isolation that fostered loneliness and despair.  Dora L. Costa and 
Matthew E. Kahn’s empirical study on the benefits of social networks in POW camps 
(specifically Andersonville) showed that survival rates were higher for prisoners with ten 
or more friends, as opposed to those with fewer social interactors.  As the population of a 
camp increased, one would need more friends to offset the rising mortality rates; however, 
if the overcrowding became extensive, “the accompanying increase in friends could not 






friends, and individuals with which a prisoner felt a common bond, improved mental 
health, and consequently physical health, and increased one’s chance of survival.  This 
improvement in psyche and spirit, however, had its limitations, and could be offset by 
rapidly worsening conditions within a camp.  Costa and Kahn’s study is a fascinating and 
welcomed approach to the analysis of POW survival, integrating environment, 
socioeconomic and ethnic status, self-care, mental health, and physical well-being into a 
data set that aids historians in understanding the value of social interactions within the 
camps. 
Consequences of the Management by Camp Commanders 
While all of the five factors are equally important to our understanding of what 
affected prisoner morale, physical well-being, and chance of survival, only one factor 
presents the opportunity for a single individual to have an immediate and lasting effect: the 
role played by the commanders of the respective camps.  Nowhere is the contrast more 
distinct than at Camp Groce when comparing the two separate periods of confinement.  The 
commander in 1863, Major Barnes, was by all accounts a kind and honorable man.  He 
issued the prisoners Confederate money on lines of credit, promoted commerce with 
outside vendors, allowed travel outside of the camp to gather wood and forage for food and 
medicines, and provided medical care comparable to what was received by his own men.  
For Thanksgiving, 1863, Barnes allowed prisoners to purchase turkeys, chickens, ham, and 
beef, for the celebration.  In an interview with the Houston Tri-Weekly Telegraph after the 
camp was emptied, Barnes, now a Lieutenant Colonel, believed that the prisoners “appear 






rebels than they had before they came here.”40  The death rate during his tenure at Camp 
Groce was 4.68%. 
 The difference between 1863 and 1864 at Camp Groce is night and day. Colonel 
Gillespie, the new commander in 1864, was a former prisoner of war himself, having spent 
less than six months at Camp Douglas in Illinois.   Gillespie was a Methodist minister 
before and after the war, displaying his religious beliefs as both a writer and editor of the 
Texas Christian Advocate and the New Orleans Christian Advocate.  His actions at Camp 
Groce, however, were decidedly un-Christian.  He “openly avowed his intention to maltreat 
prisoners, as proved by the confession of his own subordinate officers” and “wished to 
retaliate upon us (the prisoners) for alleged mistreatment of confederates in northern 
prisons.”41  He stopped commerce with outside vendors, limited trips to the creek to once 
per week, and halted all foraging for medicine, food, and supplies.  All papers were seized 
from the prisoners, the delivery of milk and eggs was ended, and stockade openings were 
closed, preventing the fresh flow of air.  He increased use of the “ball and chain” for 
punishment, as well as the new practice of “bucking,” a tortious act that entailed placing 
the hands in irons, then pulled down over the knees, with a stick thereunder to prevent 
movement.  Prisoners suffering such punishment could neither stand nor walk.42  During 
the yellow fever evacuation and trek of Fall, 1864, there “was no shelter and the mortality 
was great” as prisoners were forced to drink from a creek where horses and cattle had 
bathed, leaving the water “slimy and offensive.”  Those who died “were buried like dogs, 
and often a corpse lay for several days unburied in the camp.”  Gillespie “kept all prisoners 
sick and dying in the open air . . . when shelter was at hand . . . prevented any alleviation 






the men were confined in the stockade and “feasted” on “potato pancakes for breakfast and 
sweet potato stew for dinner.”44  After the war, Colonel Gillespie was an editor for multiple 
newspapers, briefly joined the Ku Klux Klan, and became an advocate for the temperance 
movement, earning the moniker “Grape-vine Gillespie.”45  He would be active in Texas 
politics, serve on the Galveston School Board, and eventually defect to the Republican 
Party, much to the displeasure of his fellow ex-Confederates.  Described by his political 
contemporaries as “a brutal scoundrel . . . a foul blot on the ministry” and “outside of the 
pale of gentlemen,” Gillespie was regarded throughout the remainder of his life as a man 
with “no fixed principles upon any subject” who “was at all times ready for a carouse, or 
worse.”46  The death rate during his tenure at Camp Groce was an astonishing 29.6%.  
Assessments of any person in a position of authority during wartime must be analyzed 
carefully with due consideration to the fact that those under his command may have had a 
biased recollection or a desire for revenge.  Gillespie did not leave behind any known 
journals, letters, or other contemporary writings that would allow us to see his side of the 
story during his time as commander.  His post-war writings were religious in nature due to 
his job as editor of Christian newspapers, and make no reference to his days in the 
Confederate army.  Thus we are left to our own interpretations based on an admittedly one-
sided account of the events and the commander’s intentions.  While Gillespie may not have 
been the cold, unfeeling, devil incarnate that John Read and others describe him to be, there 
is ample evidence that his actions at Camp Groce to restrict access to clean water, supplies, 
and the outside world, had a direct impact on the increase of the death rate during his tenure.  






or may not deserve in comparison to the man who, deservedly or not, became the face of 
Civil War prison atrocities, Captain Henry Wirz of Andersonville. 
 Camp Ford also operated under two primary commanders, and while they certainly 
differed in their approach to the prisoners, their contrast is not as stark as those who 
oversaw Camp Groce.  Colonel Allen was regarded as a benevolent man, who provided 
gifts of fresh food to the Union officers, and was “always regarded to be conscientious, and 
was, moreover, an educated gentleman.”47  A prisoner recalled that Colonel Allen “did 
everything within his power to make his prisoners comfortable.”48  His wife, Julia Allen, 
was beloved by the prisoners and remembered fondly as one who “cheered the despondent 
and comforted the weak, and for the sick, showed that beautiful solicitude that no one save 
a Christian woman can evince.”49   Colonel Duganne described Mrs. Allen as “an angel at 
her husband’s side” whose “acts of kindness to Federal prisoners were neither few nor far 
between.”50  On Christmas day, 1863, Colonel Allen and his wife invited the Union officers 
at Camp Ford to dine with them at their quarters.  Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Leake of 
the 20th Iowa Infantry recalled “the Colonel was as courteous and as hospitable, the 
conversation was free and unrestrained as if we had been a party of his best friends invited 
to his own home.”51  Allen’s removal as commander in May, 1864, was attributed, by at 
least one Union officer, to complaints made by some residents of Tyler about the Colonel’s 
generous nature, saying “the inhabitants were poor, ignorant and narrow-minded, and 
viewed, with angry ill-will, the liberality of Colonel Allen.”52  Allen served as 
superintendent of the Kentucky Military Institute after the war, and drowned in the 






 Colonel Anderson replaced Colonel Allen in May, 1864, and immediately 
implemented a stricter, more militaristic regimen.  While commerce was allowed to 
continue, paroles into the town and surrounding countryside were ended.  Visits by the 
local ladies stopped as well; however, this was mostly due to the absence of Mrs. Allen.  
As escape attempts increased, Colonel Anderson issued orders to shoot any prisoners 
attempting escape, or otherwise being disruptive.  On May 22, 1864, a guard shot and killed 
a prisoner who had allegedly cursed at him.54  Whether to establish fear, or just due to 
Southern indifference, Colonel Anderson allowed a female slave to be whipped “out into 
the view of the Northern men” and forced to expose “all her person from the shoulders 
downward to the flogging.”55  Punishments for a variety of offenses resulted in one being 
tied up by their thumbs, being forced to stand on a barrel for hours, or being placed in 
“dungeons” only ten feet by twelve feet and partially underground, covered with planks 
and driven full of spikes.  Union soldier Calvin Hutchinson described the latter as a “case 
of systematic murder.”56  Punishments were common in Civil War prisons for those who 
attempted escape, were guilty of a crime, or just generally disruptive; however, the degree 
and frequency must be independently considered.  Minor offenses usually resulted in just 
the loss of rations, while more significant infractions warranted a stronger punishment that 
differed from camp to camp.  Looking through the prism of history, we must also be careful 
not to apply twenty-first-century sensibilities to nineteenth-century practices.  Thus in 
analyzing Colonel Anderson’s management of the camp, what is significant is not the fact 
that punishment occurred, but rather the increase in the number of punishments and the 
severity of each based upon accepted practices at the time.  With punishment by all 






the sudden increase under Colonel Anderson of harsher punishments must have had a 
jarring effect on the prisoners, directly impacting their mental well-being and morale.  
Retaliation against one’s enemy to deter and prevent future bad acts was a commonly 
accepted practice in nineteenth-century warfare in order to safeguard the “civilized usages 
of war.”  Reasonable punishment fell under this broad umbrella; however, such punishment 
as retaliation for a committed wrong had to be carried out within an undefined acceptable 
parameter.  All participants on both sides had to avoid allowing retaliation to create “a 
savage war where there was no restraint on violence . . . where both sides unleashed the 
darkest side of human passions.”57  Captain McKinney would record in his diary during 
Anderson’s tenure “Yankee found shot dead in the woods” and “enlisted man of 130th 
Illinois killed in cold blood by sentinel,” while another “tied up by the wrists for forging a 
pass.”  On July 15, 1864, McKinney recorded in his diary the only known reference to 
violence among the inmates with the casual passage “two deaths – one killed by a mess 
mate.”58  While the actions of Colonel Anderson certainly had a negative effect on the 
morale and well-being of the prisoners, it is important to note that his tenure did overlap 
the period of the most deplorable conditions at Camp Ford, when the population swelled 
to well over four thousand inhabitants, leading to shortages in housing, food, medicine, and 
supplies in general.  Sixty-three to seventy-eight percent of those who died at Camp Ford 
did so during this period; however, as described earlier, under the commands of both 
Colonel Allen and Colonel Anderson, the overall death rate remained low at 3.86% to 
4.78%.  After the war, Colonel Anderson relegated himself to a quiet life in Eagle Lake, 







Role of Imprisoned Officers 
Morale plays a vital role in survival, especially when one is surrounded by harsh 
conditions.  The presence of officers in a camp could bring organization, a return to military 
order, and a feeling of comradery to replace the “every man for himself” mentality that 
prevails when men are left to their own accord.  Civil War officers were typically older and 
more educated than the enlisted men, with many having formal military training.  While 
their presence alone could not guarantee survival, the importance of the role they played in 
keeping morale high, and death rates low, cannot be overlooked.  Costa and Kahn’s study 
on social networking in POW camps revealed that a 10% increase in the number of officers 
(defined by them as a rank of sergeant or higher) had a correlating 1.2% increase in the rate 
of survival.60 
 Camp Groce was initially populated by only the enlisted soldiers and sailors from 
the Texas battles.  When the officers arrived from Houston and Huntsville shortly 
thereafter, they found “a listless despondency” amongst the enlisted men.  The productive 
Yankee “becomes dejected and then sick” when faced with idleness.  Convinced that “those 
were happiest who were busiest,” the newly arrived officers implemented work details for 
chopping wood, construction and maintenance of shelters, cooking and clean-up duties, et 
al.61  Morale improved as idleness decreased; however, despite the actions of the officers 
to improve the camps overall condition, they could still not prevent the inevitable illnesses 
that accompany captivity in a less than ideal environment.  Colonel Duganne reluctantly 
admitted “with the sick and dying constantly in our midst . . . a mental despondency began 






Camp Groce in 1863 would soon find themselves transferred to Camp Ford, where they 
would improve upon their prior actions, making “Ford City” a virtual model camp. 
 When Camp Groce reopened in 1864, harsh conditions imposed under Colonel 
Gillespie certainly had an impact on the mental and physical well-being of the captives; 
however, accounts also indicate a lack of control by the handful of Union officers who 
were present.  When transferees arrived from Camp Ford a few months later, one soldier 
found that “the whole camp had settled down to a kind of indifference and appeared not to 
care what became of them.”  He later found his bunkmate crying, with lice “actually eating 
at his bed-ridden sores . . . he was always so clean and neat” before, but now “had not been 
able to rid himself of them and no one had been able to assist him.”63  Morale remained 
low, and sickness and death became commonplace until the camp closed in December, 
1864. 
 While Camp Ford certainly had its advantages over Camp Groce as we have already 
seen, the role played by the imprisoned officers left an indelible mark on the camp that 
should not be overlooked when examining prisoner of war facilities.  Colonel Nott, upon 
first arriving at Camp Ford from Hempstead in 1863, described the enlisted men already 
there as “poor” and having “no supplies to sell . . . they lived on rations.”  The officers 
found their inaction to be unacceptable and “rated them soundly about their condition” and 
“lectured them severely” for not attempting to improve their situation.64 Work details, 
sanitation removal, foraging parties, and other necessary roles were established and 
functioned on a daily basis, much as they would have been in a Union camp out in the field.  
Officer’s quarters, usually consisting of larger, log cabins were constructed separately from 






enlisted.  “Ford City” soon took shape as the officers laid out plans for a village-like 
community within the stockade.  Streets were named (Park Row, 5th Avenue, Shin Bone 
Alley, and Broadway, to name a few) and sites designated for gardens, a bakery, work 
shop, meeting hall, park square, and even a baseball field.  With access to “half-dozen axes 
and hatchets, three spades, a dull saw, and our jack-knifes” the men “contrive to multiply 
tools, erect machinery, and establish manufactures, agriculture, and the mechanical arts.”65  
Industry thrived and a multitude of items were produced for camp use, as well as for trade 
or sale to the locals.  Prisoner Charles Edwards Stearns in a February, 1865, letter to his 
wife, proudly proclaimed “we have made over 3000 pies which we sold at 25 each and lots 
of crackers.”66  The structure, formality and lack of idleness improved morale, and sickness 
remained low.   
This would all change, however, when the population swelled to several thousands 
in 1864.  Many of the new soldiers were forced to sleep with only “the cold ground for a 
bed and God’s blue sky for a covering.”67  The idyllic charm of the pseudo village of Ford 
City was lost overnight, and conditions would never be the same.  Order, work 
responsibilities, and sanitation became harder to manage, and the camp was described “as 
having maggot infested piles of garbage throughout the interior.”68 The military and day-
to-day structure created by the Union officers broke down as the population continued to 
increase.  Morale declined, and sickness and death steadily increased.  As previously 
mentioned, it was during this period that the overwhelming majority of deaths occurred at 
Camp Ford.  It is interesting to note, however, that the death rate declined after October of 
1864.  Although there are few accounts describing any changes in conditions from 






that period could lead one to conclude that the officers were able to reestablish a certain 
level of camp control, especially in light of there being no known improvements in food 
rations, availability of supplies, camp population, Confederate command, or overall 
condition of the facility. 
Impact of Activities and Amusements 
Activities at Camp Groce were limited to the necessary work and commerce in 
1863, and acts simply to survive in 1864.   Those of an extracurricular nature are, by the 
known accounts, almost non-existent.  As previously mentioned, religious services were 
allowed during the first year of operation, and while there are a few accounts of chess 
playing, reading and basket making, activities of a purely recreational nature were scarce.  
As one officer bemoaned “prisoners have nothing to do but to eat.”69  During the dreadful 
season of 1864, survival, planning escape, and burying the dead were the predominate 
activities. 
 Like we have seen throughout, when it came to extracurricular activities and the 
effect they had on the spirit of the prisoners, Camp Ford was almost the polar opposite of 
Camp Groce.  For the Union captives held in Tyler, a number of activities were available 
“while the quiet one re-read or studied a few old books, played chess, or talked; our athletes 
practised at parallel bars and turning poles . . . our music-lovers met for rehearsal; and our 
dancing-men waltzed and quadrilled.”70  Colonel Duganne would fondly recall that the 
Northerners would “meet in harmony, with a violin, two banjos and a triangle” filling the 
camp with the sounds of such popular songs as “Glory Hallelujah,” “Massa’s Runn’d 
Away,” and “Rally Round the Flag Boys.”71  Sergeant Gilligan recorded in his diary “some 






teach me French.”  He later lamented that “while I was asleep someone came in and stole 
my flute,” followed by the more amusing comment of “some boys have pet squirrels.”72   
Games of all sort were played, including cricket, quoits (a type of ring toss), and baseball.  
While the latter was certainly practiced at the Houston compound and perhaps even at 
Camp Groce, it is likely that Camp Ford was the site of the first full baseball game, 
complete with a designated field, to be played in Texas.  Gymnastics, wrestling 
competitions, and gambling also became common forms of entertainment.  The most 
popular game of chance was Keno, which sometimes included even the guards.  Gambling 
may have occurred with other activities, even the otherwise friendly game of baseball, as 
Private John Kennedy of the 77th Illinois Infantry wrote in his diary on April 15, 1865, “I 
snatched a game of ball today for $20 a side.”73  For quieter men such as Colonel Duganne 
“social converse was . . . our chief enjoyment . . . there were many strong intellects among 
my comrades, with whom it became interesting to discuss both men and books.”74 
 The thriving industry at Camp Ford also provided forms of recreation not often seen 
at other prisoner of war camps.  Men baked, turned lathes, made soap, sewed clothing, and 
produced a variety of products.  Corporal Aaron T. Sutton would become the camp barber 
charging “ten cents for a hair cut, ten cents for a shave and twenty-five cents for a 
shampoo.”75  Perhaps the most impressive accomplishment of any particular soldier, 
however, was the creation of the camp newspaper, “The Old Flag,” by Captain William H. 
May of the 23rd Connecticut Volunteer Infantry.  Turning out at least three issues in 
February and March of 1864, all created by hand with a steel pen on unruled paper, May 
functioned as editor, printer, publisher and distributor of the little publication.  Each issue 






from other prisoners, but its primary purpose was “to contribute as far as possible towards 
enlivening . . . life at Camp Ford – and to cultivate a mutual good feeling between all.”76  
Only one copy was made of each issue, which was then sold to the inmates who circulated 
it “from hand to hand until every prisoner had read the copy . . . having reserved the right 
to the return of the paper, May ended up in final possession of his creation, somewhat 
shopworn but still legible.”77  Captain May successfully smuggled his original works and 
printing tools out of Camp Ford during his release, and reprinted the issues in the following 
years for posterity. 
 Even under the watchful eye of the more restrictive Colonel Anderson, who took 
over as commandant midway through 1864, the prisoners continued to enjoy a considerable 
level of freedom when it came to extracurricular activities.  In July of 1864, Anderson gave 
permission for an Independence Day celebration within the stockade, complete with 
patriotic speeches, music, and a newly constructed grandstand.  Colonel Duganne 
composed a new poem for the occasion.  As Captain Swiggett later recalled, the festivities 
broke up when “one of the men . . . got so excited that he took off his red shirt and raised 
it on a pole, amid the cheers, hoots and yells of those about him,” prompting the guards to 
put an end to the gathering “giving as a reason that we had flown the American flag.”78 
 Religious services were regularly held at Camp Ford, with encouragement and 
approval by Confederate camp commander, Colonel Allen, a pre-war minister.  In addition 
to interdenominational Sunday services conducted by Union ministers and a Confederate 
chaplain, funeral rites and baptisms were also performed as “a number of backsliders were 
reclaimed.”  To those who had been raised with a Christian upbringing, the assurance of 






others to have faith.”79  Other than the aforementioned visitations by Presbyterian minister, 
Andrew Jackson McGown, during the early months of operation, no other religious 
services, or visits by members of the clergy, occurred at Camp Groce during either period 
of operation.  Under the command of Colonel Gillespie, himself a Protestant minister, 
almost all contact with the outside world would cease, including, as far as the available 
























  Comparison to Eastern Prison Camps  
 It is easy to recognize that Camp Groce and Camp Ford are different from the prison 
camps located east of the Mississippi.  Camp Groce housed only a total of 1,105 prisoners, 
with no more than 600 to 700 at a time; Camp Ford was occupied by a total of about 6,000 
prisoners, and at times held as little as less than 100.  In the east, the prisons tended to be 
larger in scale and population, with places such as Andersonville (45,000), Elmira (12,000), 
Camp Douglas (30,000), and Belle Isle (28,000) leading the way.  Camp Groce and Camp 
Ford received their prisoners in large groups at definable points in time, resulting in a more 
cohesive prison population that was familiar with one another through geography, military 
units, and experiences.  Facilities in the East tended to have a constant flow of POW’s in 
and out of the prisons over their lifetime, creating a more divisive and unfamiliar 
population.  Camp Groce and Camp Ford were under the control of the Confederate 
Department of the Trans-Mississippi, which had a comparatively uniform system of 
management.  Andersonville, Libby, Belle Isle, and other Rebel locations in the East were 
under a more haphazard Confederate bureaucracy that did not unify under one department 
or commissary general until late November of 1864, when the war was nearly at its end.  
And yet, despite these obvious differences, Camp Groce and Camp Ford, when analyzed 
objectively using the five factors discussed herein, become a representative microcosm of 
the larger and more numerous prisoner of war camps located throughout the United States 
and the Confederate States east of the Mississippi.  Despite smaller, cohesive populations 






suffered, saw morale rise and fall, and died at alarming rates that at times rivaled, or even 
exceeded, the deservedly maligned camps in the East.  Why were these two little camps in 
Texas, which at first glance looked so remarkably different than their larger brothers on the 
other side of the river, so similar in experiences, death rates, and prisoner well-being to 
their eastern counterparts?  It is this simple question that originally led me down the path 
to what has become the core of this paper.  The explanation for why so many died, and 
why others managed to survive, had to involve more than just the well-worn discussion of 
rations, overcrowding, and general sanitation.  Using the five factors of this work in an 
objective manner, patterns began to emerge at Camp Groce and Camp Ford that shed light 
on the varying mental states and physical well-being of the inmates.  The question 
remained, however, whether or not these same factors, when applied to larger camps in the 
East, would yield similar results and/or provide the same useful perspective.   
While a comprehensive study of all POW camps using the five factors would be a 
welcome addition to the Civil War historiography of military prisons, in the interest of 
brevity of this paper, the decision was made to analyze and compare just two additional 
camps.  In deciding which two, the much discussed camps in Elmira, New York, and 
Andersonville, Georgia, begged for comparison.  Elmira, with its defined structure, 
organized system of suppliers, and well-meaning commandants, is comparable to Camp 
Ford.  However, unlike the little camp in Tyler, Elmira would have one of the highest death 
rates of any camp in the Civil War.  Andersonville would become the war’s lasting image 
of pain, suffering, and cruelty with its harsh conditions and poor management that, whether 






obvious comparison to its much smaller counterpart in Hempstead, and at times seems like 
an über-example of everything that went wrong at Camp Groce.   
Elmira Prison, USA – Elmira, New York 
 Elmira, New York, was founded in 1788 as the Township of Chemung, later 
changing to the more feminine name that local legend says was either the daughter of a 
tavern keeper or the daughter of a Revolutionary War general.  At the start of the Civil 
War, Elmira was a sleepy town with a consistent population of slightly less than 10,000 
inhabitants.  Situated on the New York and Erie Railroad, the Northern Central Railroad, 
and the Chemung Canal, the town was a crossroads between east and west, north and south, 
and became a vital center for commerce.  With its obvious access to transportation, the 
town was chosen in 1861 to be the site of a camp for Union soldiers.  Broken up into several 
venues, the area known as Camp Rathbun would eventually become the location of the 
Elmira prisoner of war camp.  Located on a sloping, rectangular field between Water Street 
and the Chemung River, Camp Rathbun would also encompass an elongated body of water 
known as Foster’s Pond.  Perceived as a valuable resource for visiting troops, the pond 
would become a site of disease and death for those soon to be imprisoned in the camp.  
Over a period of two years, the military facility would train and house over 20,000 soldiers; 
however, with the number of servicemen dwindling by 1863, the U.S. Commissary 
Department tapped the unused barracks as an obvious location to house rebel prisoners.  
With the prisoner exchange system stalled, Union officials such as General-In-Chief Henry 
W. Halleck would surmise that “it is much cheaper to feed an enemy in prison than to fight 






 An inspection of the site by Captain Henry Lazelle, himself a former POW, found 
Elmira “exceedingly healthful” and the Camp Rathbun site free of “either marsh or 
standing water . . . which could generate malaria or disease . . . no forms of low fever 
prevail.”2  The first Confederate prisoners began arriving at Elmira in July of 1864 and were 
greeted by a twelve foot high stockade surrounded by over forty sentry boxes that allowed 
the guards full view of the facility.  At first glance, the forty acre camp must have been a 
pleasant surprise to prisoners transferred from the stockade at Point Lookout, Maryland, 
and other overcrowded confinements.  With fresh grass and tree-lined streets that divided 
the camp into organized areas, and a supposed source of fresh water in Foster’s Pond, 
Elmira resembled the conditions found in the early days of Camp Ford.  However, while 
the death rate during any period at Camp Ford never exceeded 5.0% even during the most 
crowded and harshest conditions, at Elmira Prison 2,961 prisoners out of 12,147 died 
during its one year tenure, resulting in a death rate of 24.4%, one of the highest of the war.3  
While no two prison camps were ever exactly alike, Camp Ford and Elmira, as we will see, 
were similar in their structure, leadership, and conditions.  With an organized Commissary 
Department entering into numerous contracts with suppliers to provide food and clothing, 
one might even make the case that, at least on paper, Elmira was the better choice of the 
two camps in which to be confined.  And yet, despite these favorable conditions, Elmira 
still had a death rate approximately 410% higher than Camp Ford.  What accounts for such 
a gross disparity between the two camps?   What could possibly have gone wrong to earn 
the idyllic camp on the Chemung River the nickname of “Hellmira?”  In analyzing Elmira, 
I will rely heavily on Michael Gray’s work The Business of Captivity, the preeminent 






 Let us begin by looking at the factor that perhaps had the most significant impact 
on survival at Camp Groce and Camp Ford, namely the attitude and approach to 
management of the camp commandant.  While the acts of compassion by Colonel Allen at 
Camp Ford, and the outward disregard for human life exhibited by Colonel Gillespie at 
Camp Groce, were deciding factors in the rate of survival at their respective locations, the 
commanders at Elmira Prison seemed to have had little impact on the overall conditions.  
Examining and judging the leadership style of any individual in a setting such as a prison, 
where those he is commanding are in direct opposition to his very presence, is a subjective 
exercise.  Impressions are easily clouded by sympathy for one side or the other, personal 
ideologies, and twenty-first-century practice; however, basic humanity and compassion 
should remain relatively constant.  Commanders’ efforts to keep the prisoners alive were 
often hampered by shortages, bureaucratic deficiencies, the environment, and things 
generally beyond their control, and we must certainly take such factors into consideration.  
Also, death rates alone are not necessarily an indication of ineffective leadership, or a lack 
of compassion for those under one’s care.  Discipline, rules, and a rigid structure are 
necessary elements of any prison, military or civilian; however, a commander should not 
through his actions, or his negligence, worsen the conditions.  Therefore, the objective and 
most determinative analysis of whether or not a commander was a factor in prisoner well-
being and chances for survival is whether their overt actions directly increased or 
diminished the level of suffering, and whether they were personally negligent in turning a 
blind eye to suffering.   
The first commandant at Elmira was Major Henry V. Colt of the 104th New York 






younger brother of the famous revolver maker Samuel Colt, was temporarily physically 
unfit for duty in the field, and thus the perfect choice for the sedentary assignment of prison 
commander.  Popular with both Union soldiers and Confederate prisoners, Colt would 
lobby on behalf of relief organizations for entry into the camp, show flexibility when 
requests were made for increased rations, and promoted fairness.  When he left his post as 
commandant to return to action in late 1864, Colt was given “an ornately designed chalice 
. . . whittled from a coconut shell, set on a silver stand, and engraved” with a dedication, 
by the Southern prisoners.4  Colt’s replacement was Lt. Colonel Stephen Moore of the 11th 
New Jersey Volunteers, who had previously been in charge of Camp Chemung, the nearby 
facility that housed the Union soldiers who guarded the prison.  Like Colt, Moore was unfit 
for field duty, having suffered a severe case of sunstroke that had impaired his sight, 
memory, and overall health.  Also like his predecessor, Moore was viewed by soldiers and 
prisoners alike as a decent and fair man, who did what was within his authority to alleviate 
the suffering of the unfortunate Confederates.  Despite the seemingly compassionate 
attitudes of the two commandants, and their overt efforts to make the prison as livable as 
possible, Elmira still became a site of suffering and high death rates.  Arguably, both could 
have made the situation even worse had they been of the mindset of Colonel Gillespie, but 
fortunately for the Rebels, that was not the case. As we shall see, other factors played a 
larger role in the overall well-being of the prisoners. 
 Much as we saw at Camp Ford, the organized structure and discipline within Elmira 
allowed the prisoners time for personal activities and amusements.  Inmates crafted 
trinkets, jewelry, buttons, gloves, tools, and other small items for use and trade.  A “market” 






and sell their wares.  With the exchange of money prohibited, any necessary items could 
be traded for the available goods; however, tobacco became the standard currency.  As one 
prisoner, James Montgomery, lamented I “would soon as do without half my rations, as to 
be without tobacco.”5  Another prisoner would explain “the tobacco would pacify his 
stomach for two hours, while the bread would only aggravate it.”6 Prisoners who 
volunteered for work details digging trenches, building fortifications, et al, were rewarded 
with a daily whiskey ration that was often smuggled back into the camp.  Alcohol 
possession and consumption was strictly forbidden within the enclosure, but the flourishing 
black market insured that drunkenness would be a reoccurring problem.  
Confederates scavenged the camp for bone, wood, animal hair, fabric, and any other 
things that would be usable to craft items for trade within, and for sale to the outside world 
via mail orders in both the north and the south.  Guards partnered with prisoners in the 
fledgling industry by providing “bits of silver, gold, pearl, and mussel shell” for jewelry, 
the sale of which would secure the Yankees a share of the profit.7  Prisoners with skills 
obtained prior to the war also passed the time with employment as clerks, orderlies, bakers, 
mechanics, carpenters, and accountants for the Union army.  A Louisiana Confederate 
named William Lambert Campbell used his “fine penmanship” to became a “member of 
the clerical elite,” a position that awarded him extra camp credit, food, and a warm room.  
Writing to his sister, Campbell rejoiced “I am in very good health and quite comfortable; I 
have a nice room and do not suffer from the cold. I do not think there is a prisoner who 
feels more comfortable than I do.”8  
After their daily duties were completed, leisure activities were also available to 






camp band, joined the debating club, and borrowed books from the on-site library 
established in September of 1864.  The good-natured camp commander, Lt. Colonel 
Moore, inspired by their efforts, secured better instruments for the camp band, and 
designated a separate hall for Freemason Society meetings.9  The debating club would swell 
to over one hundred members, discussing issues of the day, with invites even being made 
to Union officers, but none accepted.10  The inclusion of a library and a debate club are 
indications of how survival meant more than just food, clothing, and shelter.  They show 
that prisoners were concerned about more than just their physical well-being.  Intellectual 
stimulation exposed prisoners to new ideas and differing ideologies, at a time when their 
fellow citizens were killing one another over human rights, social and political constructs, 
and geographical and cultural differences.  By improving mental health and morale, 
reading and debate may have had a direct impact on one’s physical well-being and their 
chance of survival.  Although no known records exists of which prisoners were members 
of the debate club, it would be a fascinating micro-study to see the rate of survival for 
debate participants versus non-participants during the club’s tenure at Elmira.   
For those more spiritually inclined, regular church services were permitted on 
Sundays, although no formal church existed.  Such commerce and leisure activities not 
only provided something to keep the inmates busy, but also seemingly improved ones 
chance of survival not only in acquiring needed items, but also in improving morale.  And 
yet, the dying continued.  Union Captain John S. Kidder of the 121st New York Volunteers 
would partner with prisoners for trade and profit.  In a letter to his wife in 1864, Kidder 






involved made money “like fun,” yet nevertheless remorsefully added “the Rebs are dying 
quite fast from 8 to 30 per day.”11 
 Inmate officers played very much the same role at Elmira as they did at Camp Ford.  
They organized work details, promoted camp discipline, encouraged leisure activities, 
cracked down on thieving from other prisoners, and even helped in escapes.  When allowed 
to operate in their position of rank and authority, Confederate officers reduced idleness and 
improved morale just like their Union counterparts.  The significance of this factor is more 
obvious when the officers were not allowed, or were unavailable, to do their part.  As we 
have already seen in our discussion of Camp Groce, when Union officers were either not 
allowed to lead, or were otherwise unable to do so, conditions deteriorated rapidly in the 
Fall of 1864, and the death rate skyrocketed to nearly 30%.  This factor will become even 
more prevalent in our upcoming discussion of Andersonville Prison, a camp comprised 
entirely of enlisted men. 
 With so little at this point to explain the high rates of death at Elmira Prison, we 
turn our attention to the final two factors:  the effects of the local, non-natural environment 
and the effects of the natural environment.  During its early years as a military facility, the 
number of soldiers in the Elmira Camp outnumbered the civilian population, who quickly 
came to understand the “economic value” of the military presence.12  Despite the change 
from an army base to a prison in 1864, the general needs of the inhabitants stayed much 
the same.  Local businesses thrived on the government contracts to provide such basic 
items as lime, bricks, stationery, lamp wicks, pens, pencils, envelopes, books, hay, and 
medicinal supplies, just to name a few, to the prison.  It was food delivery, however, that 






prevailed over quality as an estimated 13,000 barrels of flour and over 2.3 million pounds 
of beef were doled out to the prisoners over a one year period.13  During the peak month of 
consumption in October of 1864, the Union provided “123,734 pounds of fresh beef, 
63,530.5 pounds of pork, 242,535 pounds of flour, 17,665 pounds of beans, 8,152.5 
(pounds) of rice, and 7,322 pounds of salt.”14  Vegetables were always in short supply, and 
the Commissary Department faced the daunting task of not only having to feed the 
prisoners, but also the thousands of soldiers needed to run the facility.   
Citizens on the outside looking in regarded the prisoners as well fed.  The Elmira 
Daily Advertiser in a December 1864 editorial provided a favorable view of inmate meals 
that consisted of “one pound of meat per day, onions, potatoes, and other vegetables” that 
were enough to make a “rich and savory” soup, accompanied by bread that was “as good 
as can be found in any bakery of our city.”  For the prisoners, however, this exaggerated 
description of their daily rations was far from the truth.  Confederate inmates described 
their meals as “invariably scanty” meat, with bread “so thin that they could read the New 
York Herald through it,” both accompanied by “quasi soup . . . tasteless . . . nothing more 
than hot salty water.”15  Despite the best efforts of the Union, the quality of beef, flour, and 
other supplies rapidly declined in the early months of the prison’s existence.  Self-sufficient 
prisoners turned to fishing in the Chemung River and Foster’s Pond (until both became 
polluted), foraging for edible plants, and hunting squirrels, birds, dogs, and just about 
anything that moved.  The large population of rats within the camp became an obvious 
target, and when properly killed and dressed became worth their weight in tobacco.  
According to prisoners, the “Chinese delicacies . . . smelt very good while frying” and 






States in a minor recession, the already insufficient rations were reduced; and yet it cannot 
be claimed that the prisoners suffered due to a lack of spending by the Union government.  
During the tenure of the camp from July 1864 to July 1865, the United States spent 
$204,784 on Elmira Prison, doubling, tripling, and even quadrupling what was spent on 
comparative prisons at Camp Morton, Point Lookout, and Camp Chase during that same 
period.  Only one prison, Camp Douglas near Chicago, spent more than Elmira during the 
war; however, that was over a four year period with nearly double the prison population.17 
While the prisoners at Elmira were not allowed to engage in commerce directly 
with the local population, they were allowed to purchase items from Woodman Demorest, 
the prison sutler.  Operating exclusively within the camp, Demorest sold fruits, vegetables, 
milk, soap, stamps, clothing, et al, at inflated prices.  Despite the markups, the sutlership 
did a considerable business with the inmates, taking in over $50,000 from Elmira prisoners, 
and paying only a little over $1,700 to the prison fund for the right to do so.18 
Public fascination with the prisoners peaked during the early years as enterprising 
locals built viewing stands from which the general population could gaze upon the 
Confederates below.  For a few pennies, Elmira citizens could gawk as long as they wished, 
with refreshments and spyglasses for a closer look provided.  One local seemed surprised 
that despite their “rough appearance,” the Confederates “are generally of good size, and 
what would be called fair specimens of the race, if they were not Rebels.”  As the suffering 
of the inmates increased over time, curiosity gave way to compassion, or perhaps guilt, as 
viewers witnessed the daily task of removing the dead, with one commenting that he and 
his friends “speedily grew melancholy over the spectacle and cut our visit to the top of the 






endeavors, the viewing of the prisoners may have lent itself to compassion among the locals 
for the inmates; however, there is little indication that such feelings led to increased efforts 
of charity.  A Ladies Hospital Aid Society did frequently ask for donations, but their results 
were minimal.  What can be certain, however, is that unlike the locals living near other 
Civil War camps, or locals supposedly unaware of the atrocities being committed at 
concentration camps during World War II, the citizens of Elmira were aware of the 
conditions within the prison, and the suffering that resulted.  While public curiosity with 
the imprisoned strangers was commonplace wherever a camp was located, constructing 
such an openly invasive public display from which to view them as was done at Elmira 
constituted what Michael P. Gray referred to as “dark tourism.”  This unhealthy 
preoccupation with those less fortunate would evolve from initial curiosity to harassment 
over time.  Gray writes “dark tourists only hoped to intensify the pain of imprisonment by 
their nationalistic renditions, readings, singing, and musical playing, as if they were doing 
their part in reminding the captive audience of their disloyalty.”20  Prisoner Anthony Keiley 
of the 12th Virginia Infantry would compare the prison to a zoo as the use of the platforms 
“proposed to turn our pen into a menagerie,” further suggesting that the construction was 
a joint operation for profit between the local entrepreneurs and the Union army.  He would 
sarcastically add that in Elmira, “patriotism is spelled with a ‘y’ at the end of the first 
syllable.”21 
The last non-natural environmental factor to discuss is that of the access to hospitals 
and proper medical care.  At Camp Groce and Camp Ford, their respective periods of 
inadequate medical service led to an obvious increase in death rates.  At Camp Ford, the 






Camp Groce the decline in service after the camp reopened in 1864 seems to be due to a 
lack of compassion and concern for the inmates by camp commanders and the Confederate 
government alike, in addition to the ever-present lack of supplies.  At Elmira, six hospitals 
would be initially built, each containing sixty-two beds apiece.  In late 1864, two additional 
buildings were erected near the existing hospitals, some barracks were converted into 
convalescent wards, and additional surgeons were brought in.  The number of beds and 
available doctors was never enough, and a sufficient flow of supplies was a constant issue.   
Colonel Benjamin F. Tracy of the 127th U.S. Colored Troops had assumed the overall 
command of the Elmira Depot (the combined prison and army facilities) in September of 
1864.  A lawyer by trade, Tracy would prove to be a stickler for rules and following 
procedures down to the smallest detail.  All requisitions for medical supplies now had to 
pass through the channels of junior officers, who could approve or disapprove of requests 
with little guidance.  Despite the conditions, Superintendent of Army Nurses Dorothea Dix 
upon visiting Elmira in November 1864 was “highly gratified since prisoners were 
receiving all necessary care.”22  Regardless, inmates continued to die at alarming rates from 
fever, dysentery, scurvy, and pneumonia.  A smallpox outbreak in February and March of 
1865 would kill more than four hundred, or about 13.5% of all inmates who died during 
the prison’s existence.23 
While overcrowding and the lack of adequate medical supplies contributed to the 
high mortality rate, special mention must also be made of Elmira’s chief surgeon from July 
to December 1864, Eugene F. Sanger of the 6th Maine.  Sanger had graduated from 
Dartmouth and the Jefferson Medical College, served as a brigade surgeon since nearly the 






qualifications for the assignment, Sanger did not want the posting at Elmira and his 
enthusiasm for the job was accordingly low.24  Confederate doctors within the camp 
accused Sanger of incompetence in disciplining his staff, lack of patient care, and even 
intentional infliction of harm upon his patients.  Some accused the chief of allowing non-
patients open access to the short supplies of quinine, opium, whiskey, and other drugs that 
were stored in the dispensary.  Confederate Anthony Keiley, who worked as a clerk 
tabulating the number of daily deaths, would harshly condemn Sanger as “simply a brute” 
as men were frequently “deliberately murdered by the surgeon, especially by either the 
ignorance or malice of the chief.”25  Sanger would be replaced in December of 1864 by 
Major Anthony E. Stocker, by all accounts a competent surgeon and administrator, but 
nevertheless the number of deaths would continue to rise each month until the Spring of 
1865.  After the war, Sanger would have a successful medical practice, and serve as surgeon 
general of Maine and as president of the Maine medical association.26 
The final factor to discuss, the natural environment, had perhaps the most impact 
on the survival of the Rebel prisoners at Elmira.  Unlike at Camp Ford and the early days 
of Camp Groce, the Confederates at Elmira were not allowed to roam outside of the camp 
to forage for wood, herbs, and items to supplement their diets.  This was due in part to the 
large number of prisoners housed there.  However, the primary reason for not allowing 
passes outside of the camp was the fact that it was located within a substantial urban 
settlement, and the local citizens simply would not have tolerated tattered Rebels roaming 
the streets and nearby countryside.  In the early months, a scarcity of wood was a constant 
problem; however, by December of 1864, Colonel Tracy had secured two coal burning 






the necessity of scavenging for wood, but at a considerable cost.  According to prison 
records, the camp would use almost 375 tons of coal per month at a cost of over $4,000 per 
month, but it was never enough.27  This newfound source of heat would not relieve the 
suffering brought on by the winter of 1864/1865.   
At Camp Groce and Camp Ford, the most obvious weather-related impact was that 
of the relentless Texas heat; however, it was not a distinguishing factor between the two 
camps.  In the northern region of Elmira, New York, the role that weather played in the 
survival of the prisoners was front and center.  The Southern soldiers so far from home had 
never experienced the harsh conditions, nor the level of cold, that can be brought on by a 
New England winter.  In addition, in the Fall of 1864, only 3,873 of the 9,063 prisoners at 
Elmira were housed in actual barracks.  The remaining 57% were camped outdoors, often 
in “A” shaped tents, which could each house up to five prisoners.28  Blizzards created a 
new level of suffering among the inmates, and hampered local efforts to provide food and 
supplies.  On at least two occasions, the temperatures dropped to over fifteen degrees below 
zero.  The common practice of bathing in the Chemung River was now impracticable, and 
hygiene worsened.  Winter clothing was inadequate, with many prisoners having holes in 
their shoes, if they had shoes at all.  Frostbite, gangrene, and pneumonia was pervasive.  
Keiley would lament that in the winter in New York “anything short of a polar-bear would 
find locomotion impracticable.”  Another prisoner from Texas would cry “if there ever was 
a hell on earth, Elmira prison was that hell, but it was not a hot one.”  Over 2,000 prisoners 
arrived in the latter months of 1864 directly from North Carolina and Mississippi, with 
little more than their summer clothing, and very few blankets.  Rebel John Opie would later 






morning the men crawled out of their bunks shivering and half frozen, when a scuffle, and 
frequently a fight, for a place by the fire occurred . . . God help the sick and weak as they 
were literally left out in the cold.”29  For the four winter months from November 1864 to 
February 1865, Elmira Prison saw 1,187 deaths, or 40.08% of the total deaths that occurred 
during its twelve months in existence.  In addition, 49% of all reported illnesses in the camp 
occurred during that same period.30  While one can certainly criticize the lack of preparation 
by Union officials, and the inadequacy of supplies, the deaths and illnesses during this 
period were exasperated by an environmental condition beyond the control of man.  Better 
planning by the Northerners could have alleviated the degree of suffering; however, no 
level of preparation could have eliminated the impact of winter on the chance of survival 
and overall death rate at Elmira Prison. 
One additional weather-related event deserves mention when discussing life at 
Elmira.  In March of 1865, torrential rains created what came to be known as the St. 
Patrick’s Day flood.  A “wilderness of water” caused the Chemung River and Foster’s Pond 
to overflow into the sloping camp.  As water inundated the prison yard, guards used 
rowboats to check on prisoners and transfer the sick to higher ground. The flood destroyed 
2,700 feet of the stockade wall, and left behind debris, destroyed barracks and tents, and 
homeless prisoners.  Men succumbed to drowning and illnesses brought on, or made worse, 
by exposure to the waters.  There were 491 deaths in March of 1865, representing over 
16% of all that occurred and being the highest single month in the camp’s tenure.  Forty 
prisoners would die on just one day, also the highest for any single day at Elmira.31 
While the weather certainly impacted the overall conditions at Elmira, the single 






Pond, with its prominent location near the center of camp.  The rectangular field of Elmira 
Prison sloped downwards from the Chemung River towards Water Street, with the majority 
of the camp lying downhill from the elongated pond that stretched nearly the length of the 
enclosure.  The pond was originally perceived as an advantageous source of fresh water, a 
factor that was crucial to the chance of survival at Camp Groce and Camp Ford.  At Elmira, 
however, Foster’s Pond would turn out to be anything but an advantage to the prisoners.  
Sinks were dug on the downhill side of the pond, which Major Colt immediately recognized 
as a potential source of disease and contamination.  He recommended digging a slough to 
allow for a freer flow; however, his requests went unanswered.  With so little drainage, and 
so much misuse by prisoners, the stagnant body of water quickly became inundated with 
waste.   Dr. Sanger reported that the pond “receives its fecal matter hourly” and passes 
“2,600 gallons of urine daily.”  Concerned with the “putrid matter,” Sanger, like Colt, 
recommended digging a channel between the pond and the river to promote flow.  Just like 
Colt, his requests would be mostly ignored, until a half-hearted attempt was made after 
several months, and several deaths, too late.32    
Unlike at Camp Ford with its system of reservoirs and its self-appointed 
“Commissioner of Aqueducts,” virtually no effort was made at Elmira by either the Union 
officials or the Confederate prisoners to create a reliable, clean source of water for cooking, 
bathing, and consumption.  Instead, Foster’s Pond became a breeding ground for filth and 
diseases.  Rains of almost any quantity would cause the pond to overflow, sending its waste 
downhill into the barracks of the prisoners.  In a November 1864 report to the Surgeon 
General, Dr. Sanger continued his condemnation of the pond which “remains green with 






their sickly odors, and the hospitals are crowded with victims for the grave.”33  Lime was 
frequently poured into the pond to combat the conditions, only adding to the already 
excessive level of contamination.    
In the Fall of 1864, Colonel Tracy proposed a plan to drain the pond he saw as a 
“continued prevalence of disease and death” into the freer flowing, but uphill, Chemung 
River.  His plan to build an underground system of wooden drainage pipes was priced at 
almost $6,000, and the Commissary General William Hoffman balked at the cost.  Insisting 
that the work could be completed at a fraction of the price by inmates, Hoffman also 
downplayed the necessity of the sluice with the coming onset of winter.  A similar sewage 
system had also been proposed, and rejected, at Camp Douglas in Chicago by Union 
officials looking to keep costs down.  Kutzler argues that such reasoning “echoed the 
conservative defenders of an older, cheaper individualized system of waste and 
environmental management,” who disregarded the need to adapt to changing conditions.34  
In doing so, they also disregarded the needs of the imprisoned, and their own duty of care 
that civility imposes on them in a time of war when attending to prisoners under your 
control. On his way out of the camp in December of 1864, Dr. Sanger would make one last 
comment that the pond was still “a festering mass of corruption, impregnating the entire 
atmosphere of the camp with its pestilential odors, night and day.”35  With shortages of 
lumber, inadequate labor, and cost-cutting bureaucrats, the project that Colonel Tracy 
estimated would take two weeks instead took several months, seeing the final completion 
of the drainage system in early 1865.  However, having polluted the camp for nearly seven 
of the twelve months it was open, the damage had been done.   The deaths of 1,394 






diarrhea and dysentery, ailments brought on primarily by the unsanitary conditions of the 
pond.36   
In April of 1865, despite the recent Confederate surrenders and the pending release 
of prisoners, Lt. Colonel Moore would begin a makeover of the camp.  Sidewalks were 
finally planked, streets were graded, new sinks were dug, trees were planted, and a flower 
garden created at the western end of the stockade on the downhill side of Foster’s Pond.  
While Moore was generally regarded as a benevolent commandant during his tenure, his 
late efforts seem to be more for the purpose of creating a self-serving public image of the 
prison, rather than for the health and well-being of the prisoners.  The ruse seems to have 
worked.  On April 24th, the Elmira Daily Advertiser praised the newly adorned camp as “a 
monument of skill, enterprise, and cultivated refinement of the officers in charge of the 
camp.”37  Although there is no indication that Moore was suffering from any contemporary 
pressure to improve the image of the camp, either at the local or federal level, it does seem 
that he was consciously aware and concerned with how the prison would be portrayed post-
war.  His efforts may have been as much about protecting the image of the Union as it was 
about protecting himself.  Regardless, Elmira would have its place in history as one of the 
deadliest camps of the war, and become a favorite target of Southern apologists.  Elmira 
Prison would release its last healthy prisoner in July of 1865, and the process of dismantling 
the camp would begin.  Those too sick to be moved remained in the prison hospital until 
they recovered or succumbed to their illnesses.  Although the records show no casualties 
after July, the last patient did not leave the hospital until September, 1865.  In August, a 
public sale was conducted of almost all that was left, including tools, furniture, general 






the deceased prior to burial was purchased and relocated by a local for use as a storage 
shed.38  After the war, as criticism of the treatment of Union prisoners in the South 
increased, ex-Confederates would point to the high death rates at Elmira as an example of 
Yankee cruelty.  However, from the Northern perspective, they had made every effort to 
secure the health of the Rebel prisoners, and were simply thwarted by effects beyond their 
control.  As one newspaper reported in 1864, the caretakers at Elmira were “of a character 
that reflects the highest credit upon Northern humanity.”39  Despite these perceptions, 
Elmira would be linked by Southerners, and in later years historians, to the Confederate 
prison at Andersonville, Georgia, due to their similar death rates.  The statistics alone, 
however, are where the similarities end.   
Like most Civil War prison camps, after the war, the site of Elmira was generally 
ignored and forgotten by the public.  The land would pass back into private hands, and 
locals would occasionally find relics and human remains during excavations.  In 1937, The 
United Daughters of the Confederacy would erect a memorial in nearby Woodlawn 
Cemetery to honor those Rebels who never returned to their loved ones from their 
temporary home in New York.  Centennial celebrations in the 1960’s would renew interest 
in the camp; however, it would take another twenty years before the first monument would 
be placed at the site.  Today, the location of the Elmira Prison is mostly privately owned, 
with historical markers and remembrances provided by the Chemung County Historical 
Society and the Friends of Elmira Civil War Prison Camp organization. 
Andersonville Prison, CSA – Andersonville, Georgia 
 Andersonville, Georgia, was founded in 1853 as the township of Anderson, being 






through the area.  The U.S. Post Office Department would change the name to 
Andersonville in 1855 to avoid any confusion with the larger city of Anderson, South 
Carolina.  Never having a population greater than 350, Andersonville was a quiet country 
hamlet over ninety miles southwest of the state capital at Milledgeville, and a lifetime away 
from the main events of the Civil War.  With the prisoner exchange system in shambles by 
late 1863, the decision was made to create a new prisoner of war camp in Georgia.  
Originally named Camp Sumter, after the county in which it was located, the site would 
soon take on the name of the nearby little town.  Unlike the townspeople of Hempstead, 
Tyler, and Elmira, the locals in Southwest Georgia did not welcome a military facility so 
close to their isolated community.  A local newspaper questioned whether there would be 
enough guards “to keep these filthy cutthroats from wandering about our kitchens and 
negro cabins, spreading their loathsome diseases and principles amongst our slaves.”40    For 
others, however, their concern was more with the presence of the Confederate soldiers 
rather than the inmates.  As one local rebel soldier writing home to his family suggested 
“we . . . ar all very much oppose to it knowing what destruction it is to a countery to send 
Soldiers to it.”41   
The first prisoners began arriving at Andersonville in February of 1864 to a 
stockade that was still under construction.  Originally comprised of approximately 16.5 
acres, the rectangular camp was surrounded by a fifteen foot wall with multiple sentry 
boxes located a little over eighty feet apart.  Two gates located on the west side of the 
enclosure provided the only points of ingress and egress, and were heavily guarded at all 
times.  A second stockade wall around the exterior provided an additional layer of security.  






of the ironically named Sweet Water Creek.  This murky tributary would serve multiple 
functions including washing, waste removal, latrine, and throughout much of the life of the 
camp, the only source of drinking water.  The creek and the equally uninviting swampy 
land on either side of it became on obvious source of contamination and disease.  While 
the condition of the creek draws a natural comparison to Foster’s Pond, it must be noted 
that the inmates at Elmira Prison also had access to the Chemung River and fresh water 
wells which provided alternative sources for cooking and consumption.   
The conditions at Andersonville were unfavorable to survival from the start, and as 
they worsened over the fourteen months of the camp’s existence, the prisoners would at 
times become their own worst enemies.  Meant to hold only 10,000 prisoners, 
Andersonville would within a few months of its opening see its population rise to over 
30,000.  Although the camp would eventually be enlarged to about 27 acres, the 
overcrowding would leave each man with an average of only 33.2 square feet in which to 
live.  Prison officials made no effort to lay out streets, or require inmates to construct their 
meager housing in rows or any sort of coordinated fashion.  This “tragic omission” led not 
only to an impractical level of disorganization, but also “resulted in a hodgepodge of 
structures that rendered policing of the prison practically impossible after it became 
crowded.”42  The suffering was daily, with no periods of reprieve as experienced at the 
other camps discussed herein.  After a January 1865 visit, Southerner Eliza Frances 
Andrews, an “ardent rebel,” would  lament “it is dreadful . . . my heart aches for the poor 
wretches, Yankees though they are, and I am afraid God will suffer some terrible 
retribution to fall upon us for letting such things happen.”43  Although shoddy Confederate 






who lived and died at Andersonville, the general consensus is that approximately 13,000 
of the 45,000 prisoners perished during its tenure, creating a death rate of 28.8%.  While 
this extreme overcrowding was a direct result of the breakdown of the exchange system 
and the Dix-Hill Cartel, the Confederacy was slow to respond to the problem.  By the time 
plans were made to build a second large-scale facility near Millen, Georgia (Camp 
Lawton), after months of inaction and unproductive squabbling, many prisoners were too 
ill to be safely moved. Many more would die during such transfers to other facilities and 
upon their eventual release.  For others, the effects of Andersonville would linger long after 
their return home.  Private Temolian Tilford of the 8th Iowa Cavalry would be captured at 
the Battle of Brown’s Mill in July of 1864, and taken to Andersonville.  He would survive 
the experience and be released with thousands of others in April of 1865; however, his life 
would never be the same.  Although he lived another seventeen years until his passing in 
1882 at the age of 39, Tilford was always weak, suffered from a nagging cough, was 
plagued by nightmares of his experience, and according to his family, simply was not the 
man he was prior to the war.44   
Andersonville would have long term effects on not only the physical and mental 
well-being of its inhabitants, but also on the American psyche of what it meant to be a 
prisoner of war.   Sectional differences would lead to arguments that still go on today over 
which side treated their prisoners better, with Elmira and Andersonville typically at the 
center of the disagreements.  What seemed to be universally accepted, however, was that 
in the future society should improve the way prisoners, both civilian and military, would 
be managed.  Care for those in civilian prisons prior to the war was inadequate at best, and 






through the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century to reform civilian prisons were 
likely affected by what was witnessed in wartime camps.  Reformers such as Dorothea Dix, 
who saw first-hand the tragedies at places like Elmira, would campaign for prison reform 
in the areas of sanitation, rehabilitation, and mental health. The large number of post-war 
memoirs by incarcerated soldiers, with their sometimes embellished recollections, swayed 
public opinion as well.  Increased awareness, reform movements, and changing perceptions 
in society are perhaps the true lasting legacy of Civil War prisons.  Civilizations are judged 
not just by their mistakes, but by how they learn from those mistakes and change 
accordingly in deference to justice, equality, and humanity.  Despite lessons learned, 
however, war tends to bring out the worst in humanity, as we saw at Abu Gharib prison in 
Iraq in the early twenty-first century, and death and suffering will almost always inevitably 
occur. 
 At each of the previous camps discussed herein, while all factors played their part 
in the rate of survival of the prisoners, there was one particular factor that stood out for 
each that seemed to have the most significant impact.  At Camp Groce, it was the 
oppressive leadership of Colonel Gillespie.  At Camp Ford, it was the eventual over-
crowding that ruined the idyllic nature of the camp.  At Elmira, it was the festering Foster’s 
Pond that hindered health throughout.  With Andersonville, however, it is difficult to point 
to any one particular factor, event, individual, or condition that was the primary instigator 
of the suffering.  Instead, it was a combination of bad management, poor decision making, 
appalling conditions, and a wholly unsanitary environment that led to one of the highest 
death rates of any prison during the war.  Andersonville is simply a study in how not to 






auspices of the Confederate Department of the Trans-Mississippi, Andersonville would fall 
under the control of a jumbled commissary department hampered by bureaucracy and 
devoid of effective leadership.  While the latter certainly had an impact on Andersonville, 
it is too easy of a path for historians to take to simply dismiss the problems of the camp 
due to government snafus.  Camp Groce and Camp Ford were under the same federal 
government west of the Mississippi, and yet had decidedly different conditions and death 
rates.  Andersonville is a near “perfect storm” of what can go wrong, checking off all five 
factors to the detriment of the prisoners, and yet remains today one of the most 
controversial camps of the war. 
 As with Elmira Prison, the first of the five factors to discuss will be the role of the 
camp commandant.  However, unlike at Elmira where this factor was one of the least 
consequential, at Andersonville the attitudes and approach to management by the 
commandant would be paramount, and create one of the most lasting and controversial 
legacies of the prison.  Heinrich Hartmann Wirz, better known to history as Captain Henry 
Wirz, was a Swiss immigrant with an interest in medicine who took over as commander of 
the camp in March of 1864.  Forced to leave his native Switzerland in 1848 as a condition 
of parole for a four year prison sentence, Wirz would find his way to America and find 
work as a physician’s assistant and plantation overseer in Kentucky and Louisiana.46   At 
Andersonville, he would gain a reputation as an uncaring warden who was prone to fits of 
anger and irrational behavior.  Private John McElroy of the 16th Illinois Cavalry, who would 
be a prisoner at Andersonville for eight months in 1864 and would write a four volume 
account of his time in captivity after the war, would describe Wirz as “a fidgety man” who 






quality that commanded respect from any one who knew him . . . his cruelty” was a result 
of “a mind incapable of conceiving the results of his acts, or understanding the pain he was 
inflicting.”47  To others, he was simply the “Andersonville Butcher,” whose overt malice 
towards the Yankees heightened the already deplorable conditions at the prison.48  
Separating fact from fiction when it comes to Wirz has been an ongoing battle for historians 
as Southern apologists sought to rehabilitate his reputation, and perhaps their own, shortly 
after the war ended.  Any commander would have struggled to care for the prisoners under 
the horrible conditions found at Andersonville.  However, what distinguished Wirz from 
his counterparts at other camps, and what may have ultimately sealed his fate, was his 
unwillingness to do even the most minor things to alleviate the suffering.  He made little 
to no effort to improve the quantity and quality of the rations provided to the prisoners.  He 
allowed the guards to terrorize the prisoners and commit random acts of murder.  He 
prohibited the flow of supplies into the camp that would have allowed the inmates to build 
shelters and dig proper wells.  He stopped the practice of allowing prisoners to go outside 
of the stockade to gather wood for cooking.  He ignored pleas from prisoners and doctors 
alike for more hospital space and better sanitation.  When Confederate inspector Daniel T. 
Chandler issued a scathing report on the conditions at Andersonville in 1864, Wirz 
“ridiculed his manhood and loyalty” to their superiors, and called him “the plaything of 
cute Yankees.”49   Perhaps most damning of all, however, was his temperament and blatant 
indifference to the suffering.  Private McElroy would comment “I never saw Wirz when 
he was not angry; if not violently abusive, he was cynical and sardonic . . . never, in my 
little experience with him did I detect a glint of kindly, generous humanity; if he ever was 






years later, to comprehend Wirz’s attitude, McElroy would question “how a man could 
move daily through such misery as he encountered, and never be moved by it except to 
scorn and mocking is beyond my limited understanding.”50  Nevertheless, Wirz remains a 
complicated figure.  Were the conditions at Andersonville beyond the control of any 
commander?  Was he simply following orders, and if he was, does that exonerate his 
actions?  Was his conduct any harsher than what was expected of a wartime prison 
commandant, and if it was not, once again does that excuse his management of the camp?  
After the war, Wirz would be charged with conspiring to impair and injure the lives 
of the prisoners, as well as murder “in violation of the laws and customs of war.”  With an 
array of testimony against him by Union prisoners and Confederate guards, Wirz was 
summarily found guilty and sentenced to death.  On November 10, 1865, Henry Wirz 
would be hanged in Washington D.C. in the shadow of the U.S. Capitol, making him the 
only Confederate officer executed after the conflict for crimes against prisoners of war.51  
He had already been convicted in the court of public opinion, and the judgment seemed 
inevitable from the outset.  Newspapers in the North demanded that “some expiation must 
be expected for the most infernal crime of the century.”  Lead prosecutor, Colonel Norton 
Parker Chipman, would talk of the “treasonable conspiracy” by the South against Union 
prisoners, and label Wirz one of the “mercenary and heartless monsters” who exhibited 
“intrinsic wickedness.”  Historian Benjamin G. Cloyd would comment, “Wirz was no mass 
murderer but simply an ineffective and callous officer” who “became the personification 
of Southern brutality.”52   While apologists are correct that the Swiss Captain became the 
scapegoat for the failings of the Confederacy to care for their prisoners, Henry Wirz was 






already egregious conditions at Andersonville.  While a more benevolent commander 
would have faced the same problems that Wirz had with supplies, overcrowding, and the 
incompetent Confederate bureaucracy, simple acts of humanity towards the prisoners 
might have lowered the degree of suffering, and kept one free from the hangman’s noose.  
However, considering the harsh reality of the four other factors at Andersonville, it is 
difficult to conceive that even the actions of a kind man, such as Colonel Allen from Camp 
Ford, would have had much of an impact on the overall death rate.   
While Henry Wirz absorbed much of the blame for the conditions at Andersonville, 
a fair amount of criticism needs to also be laid at the feet of General John H. Winder, who 
served as commissary general of Confederate prisons in Georgia and Alabama from 1864 
to 1865, as well as the Confederate government as a whole.  As Wirz’s superior, Winder 
was in charge of requisitioning food, medicine, and supplies for Andersonville, while also 
controlling the flow of prisoners and personnel.  Whether through incompetence or 
indifference, Winder faltered in navigating the murky waters of the Confederate 
bureaucracy, and feuded with his fellow officers such as General Howell Cobb, 
commander of the Georgia State Guard, over logistics.  He was reviled by Union prisoners 
and Confederate inspectors alike.  Private McElroy would describe him as “an obscure, 
dull old man . . . remorseless and cruel” who would brag that he was “doing more to kill 
off Yankees than twenty regiments at the front.”  Colonel D.T. Chandler in his inspection 
report for the Confederate War Department would in August 1864 describe Winder as 
“very indifferent to the welfare of the prisoners, indisposed to do anything, or to do as 
much as I thought he ought to do, to alleviate their sufferings.”  When Chandler 






Winder replied “that he thought it was better to see half of them die than to take care of the 
men.”  In July of 1864, Winder would issue a military order that should the Union army 
get within seven miles of Andersonville, the artillery battery was to “open upon the 
stockade with grapeshot” to eliminate the prisoners.53  Historians have struggled to define 
Winder’s degree of culpability, and the veracity of the claims made against him, even 
questioning the report of Chandler, a suspected Union sympathizer.  However, historian 
Ovid L. Futch, in his seminal work History of Andersonville Prison, argues that even if 
Chandler was biased, overwhelming evidence suggests that his condemnation of the camp, 
and Winder, were accurate.  Nevertheless, Futch admits that Winder’s “true character was 
a puzzle to his contemporaries and remains an enigma to historians.” Whether due to 
incompetence or an intention to inflict harm, Winder’s actions convinced others “that he 
was devoid of feelings of humanity for the captives.”54  He was, however, hampered, and 
at times completely handcuffed, by a Confederate bureaucracy that was devoid of 
organization and effective leadership, and was preoccupied more with the survival of the 
government than they were with the treatment of Yankee prisoners.  Despite Winder’s 
complaints about overcrowding at Andersonville, and requests that no additional prisoners 
be sent, the flow of inmates to Georgia from Richmond continued.  Concerned with 
dwindling resources in the capital and the risk created by having so many prisoners near 
the ever-closer front lines in Virginia, the Confederate government prioritized survival over 
humanitarianism.55  Winder’s repeated complaints of low rations were largely ignored by 
his superiors who placed concern for Rebel soldiers over Yankee prisoners, and traded 
petty barbs over the command structure and who was in charge of whom.  Post-war 






especially when rations were in short supply.  However, humanity demands that one take 
care of prisoners under their control who are less capable of improving their own conditions 
via self-care.  Also, while supplies were on the decline in the Confederacy in the latter half 
of the war, it is not true that food was not available for the POW’s.  The Army of the 
Tennessee located within a few hundred miles of Andersonville was by their commander’s 
own account “well supplied with staples procured locally . . . with fresh beef from cattle 
driven up from Florida.”  Per Confederate commissary reports, a supply depot in Danville, 
Georgia, in April of 1865 was said to contain 1.5 million rations of meat and 500,000 
rations of bread.  Meanwhile, Union troops entering Salisbury, North Carolina, that same 
month discovered “100,000 bushels of corn, 60,000 pounds of bacon, 100,000 pounds of 
salt, 20,000 pounds of sugar, 27,000 pounds of rice, 50,000 pounds of wheat, 30,000 
pounds of cornmeal, and 100,000 pounds of flour.”56  In early 1865, with the Union army 
marching through Georgia, Winder would urge his government to parole the prisoners and 
send them home.  The response was a denial of his request, and an order to further reduce 
rations.  All things considered, Winder was not devoid of compassion for his fellow man, 
but he also did not seem motivated to go beyond what was minimally required of him to 
manage Andersonville.  He made requests for improvements, but rarely followed up on 
them.  He was frustrated by his superiors, but made little effort to cut through the red tape 
and rectify the problems.  A more competent, or inspired, bureaucrat might have been able 
to make a difference for the prisoners; but Winder was simply not that man.  While he 
would certainly not escape scrutiny during and after the war, unlike his hapless subordinate 
Captain Wirz, General Winder would escape trial and potential punishment.  A little over 






attack in South Carolina.  The Winder building, a federal office in Washington, D.C. of the 
United States Trade Representative, still bears his family’s name. 
Union and Confederate officers imprisoned at Camp Groce, Camp Ford, and Elmira 
Prison all played a significant role in maintaining order and creating a sense of military 
discipline within the camps.  Their actions reduced idleness, improved morale, and affected 
the likelihood of survival.  Andersonville, however, was comprised entirely of enlisted 
Union soldiers, and thus the lack of officers would have a negative effect on the rate of 
survival within the camp.  Out of a fear that they would organize revolts, the Rebels 
separated out the prisoners, sending all Union officers to Macon, Georgia.  A few, however, 
would slip through the cracks.  According to Private McElroy, in August of 1864, 
approximately 200 to 300 officers, who had passed themselves off as enlisted men, were 
discovered amidst the new prisoners.  They were immediately removed and sent to Macon 
as “it would not do to trust such possible leaders with us another day.”57  Not unexpected, 
the absence of officers at Andersonville resulted in disorganization, a lack of discipline, 
violence, and chaos.  After a fellow inmate suffering from chronic diarrhea had his pants 
and underwear stolen while he was trying to clean them, Sergeant Eugene Forbes of the 4th 
New Jersey Infantry was disgusted to admit “our own men are worse to each other than the 
rebels are to us.”58  
With “a community of twenty-five thousand boys and young men – none too 
regardful of control at best – and now wholly destitute of government,” there simply was 
no established structure to maintain order.59  Accordingly, some inmates created violent 
gangs that harassed, robbed, and murdered their fellow prisoners.  The most infamous 






intimidation, they acquired food, supplies, and items for trade or sale to the guards, 
allowing them to become better fed and stronger physically than the other prisoners.  As 
Futch points out, the Raiders were “well-organized and accustomed to brawling . . . better 
armed” causing many a prisoner to dread “the approach of darkness, for though the Raiders 
did not hesitate to club, cut, stab, and rob during the daylight hours, they were much more 
active at night.”60  In one of the few acts of compassion by Captain Wirz, or perhaps simply 
as a means to maintain some semblance of order, he responded to the pleas of the terrorized 
inmates and rounded up the leaders and most violent members of the oppressive group.  
Searching the campsites of the Raiders, guards would find a cache of blankets, clothing, 
jewelry, money, cooking supplies, and even buried bodies and skeletons.  After trials 
conducted by their peers, the majority of the Raiders were sentenced to minor punishments; 
however, the six leaders were executed via hangings carried out by their fellow prisoners 
in July of 1864.  Afterwards, the prisoners would organize a pseudo-police force knows as 
the “Regulators” to, at the very least, prevent rampant criminal activity within the camp.61  
Despite these efforts, Andersonville throughout its existence was a scene of disorganization 
and undisciplined prisoners.  The presence of Union officers would have certainly created 
a greater sense of order, and perhaps prevented the creation of groups such as the Raiders.  
However, considering the other factors yet to be discussed, no amount of discipline by 
Yankee officers could have prevented the immeasurable suffering that occurred within the 
camp. 
While Andersonville had a lack of officers, the camp did contain a handful of 
prisoners not seen in the Confederate camps in Texas, namely black POW’s.  Estimates are 






Battle of Olustee, Florida, in February of 1864, were confined at Andersonville.  Frank 
Maddox of the 35th United States Colored Troops would remember “they put us to work, 
pulling up stoops around the stockade, cutting wood, and doing first one thing and then 
another . . . put to burying the dead . . . helped to enlarge the stockade.”62  Confederate 
records, shaky even under the best of conditions, are mostly incomplete when it comes to 
the period of confinement and disposition of many of the black prisoners.  The fate of a 
few, however, can be determined.  Corporal James Gooding of the 54th Massachusetts 
Volunteer Infantry would pass away at Andersonville in June of 1864, and was “buried in 
integrated burial trenches without regard for race . . . the soldiers buried on either side of 
him were white.”63 
 Like its much smaller counterparts in Texas, Andersonville was located in an open, 
relatively flat area, surrounded by forest, and with an already present source of water.  
Likewise, its inmates were subject to the unforgiving heat of a summer in the South.  After 
a comparison of basic conditions, however, the similarities end.  Despite an abundance of 
pine trees near the camp, wood for construction and cooking was always in short supply.  
A shortage of tools, and access to a sawmill, hampered even the initial construction of the 
stockade.  After the outer walls were completed, almost no effort was made to procure 
wood with which to build barracks for the prisoners.  When lumber did arrive via train 
from elsewhere, it would “disappear” into the surrounding area, leaving the unfortunate 
Yankees exposed to the elements.  As Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Persons, a short 
term early commander of the camp, would comment upon visiting Andersonville later, “I 






but instead “I saw forty or fifty houses springing up outside of the grounds . . . the lumber 
disappeared in that way.”64   
When the population of the prison was still at a reasonable level, inmates were 
allowed to go outside in small numbers to gather wood and forage for whatever else they 
could find.  However, after the population swelled, and escape attempts increased, such 
excursions became “unworkable” for the prison guards and were halted almost entirely.  
Unable to gather wood outside on a consistent basis, and with the camp itself completely 
stripped of vegetation in short order, the prisoners were unable to cook their food, or enjoy 
the company of a warm fire on a cold Southern night.  Prisoners scavenged for wood scraps, 
secretly traded with guards, and volunteered to take their comrades to the hospital or death 
house just so they could grab whatever timber they could find on their way back.  Private 
McElroy would recall “when logs were occasionally found or brought back into prison, 
men tore them to pieces with almost their naked fingers,” and suggested an intention of the 
Rebels to cause harm for “what else than deliberate design can account for this systematic 
withholding from the prisoners of that which was so essential to their existence, and which 
it was so easy to give them?”65  Like Camp Groce and Camp Ford, nature provided an 
abundance of resources right outside the prison gates.  However, as was seen at Groce 
during its second tenure under Colonel Gillespie, denying access to such resources 
hindered survival and appears in hindsight to be little more than an intentional effort to 
increase the level of suffering. 
The most striking feature of the natural environment at Andersonville was the small 
creek that ran through the center of the camp.  Originally perceived as a convenient source 






over time an almost unbelievable source of contamination and disease, as well as a symbol 
of the appalling lack of humanity at the prison.  The creek was surrounded on either side 
by a “quaking bog of slimy ooze one hundred and fifty feet wide” upon which one would 
“sink to the waist.”66  Infested with maggots at a depth of fifteen to eighteen inches, the 3.5 
acre swamp was a hazard from the beginning, becoming a biological nightmare as men 
defecated and deposited waste throughout.67  The condition of the creek was not much 
better.  Refuse from the Rebel kitchen located at the high point on the creek flowed through 
the camp, and Confederate soldiers outside the stockade polluted it with their waste.  Rains 
washed excrement and debris into it, and out of it into the camp.  Prisoners used it to wash 
their lice-ridden clothes, bathe, and as a toilet.  The creek was also, unfortunately, often the 
only source of drinking water.  With so little wood available for cooking, inmates were not 
afforded the “luxury” of being able to boil their water prior to consumption.  Prisoners 
attempted to dig water wells with whatever tools were available, with almost always 
undesirable results.  If one could keep the well from caving in, no small feat with the lack 
of wood and building supplies, they would soon find it polluted with the seepage from the 
filthy conditions of the camp.  As one prisoner commented in his journal “the well water 
appears impregnated with sulfur or some mineral, looks blue, and induces diarrhea.”68  
From April to August 1864, the number of deaths would rise from 576 to 2,993 per month, 
an increase of 420%.69 
In August of 1864, a strong rain cut a channel beneath a tree stump, and opened up 
a free flowing spring of fresh water.  Seen by the prisoners as a sign of divine intervention 
after a recent prayer for deliverance, the new source of water was labeled the “Providence 






flood of pure, sweet water in an apparently exhaustless quantity . . . it seemed as truly a 
heaven-wrought miracle.”  As the Regulators took charge of the spring, “every one was 
compelled to take his regular turn in filling his vessel . . . and every morning . . . a thousand 
men could be seen standing in line, waiting their turns to fill their cans and cups with the 
precious liquid.”70  The Miracle Spring still flows today from the ground at Andersonville, 
and tourists are allowed to bottle up a sample to take home with them.  However, a sign 
nearby cautions “water unfit for human consumption” and encourages one not to drink it. 
Although the presence of the spring improved a prisoner’s chance of survival 
during the final eight months of the camp, it did not remove the ever-present danger 
presented by the contaminated creek and the festering swamp.  Death continued to occur 
on an appalling scale, and prisoners continued to suffer under the harsh conditions due to 
the lack of shelter, food, and basic protection from the elements.  Under such demoralizing 
conditions, morale among the inmates declined, and many simply resigned themselves to 
death after giving way to their despondency.  A Yankee prisoner who would later die of 
his own ailments at another prison in South Carolina would write that despite the care given 
to a fellow inmate, he has “lost all ambition, has given up hope, and desires only to be left 
alone to die in his filth,” then sadly adds that “these sights can be seen in any part of the 
camp and are not isolated cases.”71 
 As we have already seen at other locales, the impact of the natural environment on 
the chances of survival can be mitigated by the effects of the local, non-natural 
environment.  Harsh weather can be countered by adequate housing.  A shortage of food 
and medicinal herbs that can be foraged can be offset by allowing prisoners to trade with 






exacerbated by the local, non-natural environment.  At Camp Groce, the lone doctor left in 
the area to attend to the prisoners in 1864 was a drunkard who likely did more harm than 
good.  The make-shift hospital in Hempstead was in such poor physical condition that 
prisoners were sometimes injured just trying to navigate its corridors.  At Andersonville, 
as with the other factors, the local, non-natural environment would have a detrimental 
effect on the rate of survival, and the overall morale of its fateful inmates. 
 Although the structure of the stockade in Georgia was constructed in a similar 
fashion to those of the other prisons, the camp at Andersonville had a unique feature that 
added to the suffering:  the dead line.  Located about twenty feet from the inside walls of 
the stockade, the dead line was a short fence that ran the entire perimeter of the 
encampment and created a no-man’s land between the main area of the camp and the outer 
walls.  Any prisoner crossing the dead line would be shot without warning, although just 
approaching the line could prove to be fatal.  As Private McElroy recalled, some of the 
guards were especially “treacherous and brutal” and “killed prisoners under the pretense 
that they were across the Dead Line, when the victims were a yard or more from the Dead 
Line, and had not the remotest idea of going any nearer.”72  Inmates were unnecessarily 
shot for reaching near the line to get the “freshest” water from where the creek entered the 
camp, or for retrieving items that landed near the barrier.  While all camps had a few guards 
that exceeded their authority and exhibited an unacceptable level of brutality, the sentinels 
at Andersonville were especially harsh in their treatment of the prisoners.  Comprised 
primarily of Georgia and Alabama state militias, instead of enlisted soldiers, the guards 
were described as “the worst looking scalawags” and “the off scourings of the South” who 






dead years ago for the good of their country.”73  Corporal Samuel J. Gibson of the 103rd 
Pennsylvania Volunteers would comment in his journal kept while at Andersonville “the 
killing of a Yankee by the Rebel Guards is to common an occurrence . . . my heart sickens 
at such cruelty . . . some of the guards it seems would rather fire than say ‘stand back’.”74  
While discipline by the guards to maintain order and prevent escapes is a necessary 
condition in any prison, the actions taken by those at Andersonville were excessive.  Men 
“assassinated by the guards” while not even making an effort to escape, nor having 
transgressed a prison rule, were simply murdered in the eyes of the prisoners, leading one 
to comment “the slaying of every man there was a foul crime.”75 
 The constant threat of death presented by the dead line added to the already harsh 
environment of the camp.  Food was always in short supply, and rations were sometimes 
withheld as punishment.  When provided, the fare was often less than palatable, 
undercooked, spoiled, and filled with bugs.  David Kennedy of the 9th Ohio Volunteer 
Cavalry would write in his diary “only one ration in three days,” and on the 4th of July 
would comment “we draw this evening spoilt beef and maggotly mush alive with worms . 
. . what a grand dinner for the Fourth.”76  As Amy Murrell Taylor would comment in her 
work, Embattled Freedom (2018), “war required a continued fight for bodily control and 
survival against harsh odds” and “food had become a weapon in this war.”77  While limited 
opportunities existed at Andersonville for prisoners to exhibit self-care when it came to 
food, the choices they did make in preparation, cooperation with others, and self-control 
stressed individuality in an otherwise collective environment.  
Inmates fortunate enough to have housing were in the same type of “A” shaped 






in niches they had dug out of the hard Georgia soil.  Prisoners were clothed in whatever 
garments they brought with them into the camp, or whatever they could steal from fellow 
inmates, whether alive or dead.  The Confederacy made no effort to provide clothing, and 
did not allow benevolent or capitalistic outsiders to send in even this most basic of 
necessities.  The lack of proper clothing may have been an intentional assault on the psyche 
of the prisoners, and not just due to inadequate supplies.  Taylor contends that “nineteenth-
century Americans believed wholeheartedly that clothing was an important, visible marker 
of status and social position . . . changeable rather than fixed . . . a highly validating process, 
a source of self-satisfaction.”78  Thus a denial of such an element of status demeaned a 
prisoner, making him less than what he was prior to capture, attacking him as an individual.   
In the earliest days of the camp, before the population swelled to unmanageable 
numbers, prisoners were allowed outside in small groups to forage or trade for whatever 
they could find.  Complaints by locals of the danger presented by roaming Yankees, 
combined with the dramatic increase to over 12,000 inmates by May 1864, put a permanent 
end to the practice.  Thereafter, trading with guards, locals, or anyone other than the 
expensive prison sutler was forbidden.  Despite the harsh realities of life within the camp, 
the Confederate government would fail to act to improve conditions, and citizens aware of 
the camp would turn a mostly blind eye to the suffering.  As an editor for the Daily 
Richmond Examiner would cavalierly comment in 1864 “not more than ten or eleven 
deaths occur per day – supplies can be obtained in abundance, and the situation is not 
unhealthy.”79  The locals were certainly aware of the conditions.  Ambrose Spencer, a 
resident of Americus, Georgia, located about fifteen miles from the camp, would comment 






passing up and down the railroad, if the wind was favorable, the odor from the stockade 
could be detected at least two mile away.”80  Private James E. Anderson, a guard at 
Andersonville, would even write to Confederate President Jefferson Davis in June of 1864, 
imploring him to stop the killings and improve conditions as “a soldier, a statesman, and a 
Christian.”81 
 The most obvious characteristic of the local, non-natural environment at 
Andersonville that distinguishes it from the other camps is simply its location.  Camp Groce 
was located in Hempstead, Texas, a bustling little town on a key railroad stopping point.  
Camp Ford was in Tyler, Texas, a local seat of commerce that already housed an arsenal 
and a military supply depot.  Elmira, New York, was at the crossroads of two rail lines and 
a canal, with a population of almost 10,000 when the prison opened.  In all three 
communities, the locals were not only fascinated by the “visiting” Rebels and Yankees, but 
also appreciated the available opportunities for commerce and trade.  Andersonville, 
however, presented a sharp contrast.  Isolated in rural Southwest Georgia with a population 
of only a few dozen, the small agricultural community was simply not prepared for, and 
did not welcome, the change that occurred with the opening of the prison.  Locals resisted 
impressment of their slaves for labor in building the stockade, and gouged Confederate 
officials on prices for sawmill lumber and other supplies.  Likely struggling to provide for 
themselves during the late stages of the war, the citizens of Andersonville made little effort 
to take advantage of the capitalistic opportunities presented to them, as the citizens near 
other prison sites had eagerly embraced.  Regional groups such as the Americus Ladies 
Aid Society would visit the camp in the early months; however, their visits were to satisfy 






Clayton of Americus, Georgia, “was disposed to say ugly things to them & glory at their 
being captured, and imprisoned,” taking pleasure from their misfortune instead of making 
an effort to uplift their morale.82  As the months wore on, and the conditions and smell of 
death worsened at the camp, the number of visitors dramatically declined.  Private McElroy 
would sharply criticize the failure of those who would normally be expected to exhibit 
compassion, “the churches of all denominations – except the solitary Catholic priest, Father 
Hamilton – ignored us as wholly as if we were dumb beasts . . . lay humanitarians were 
equally indifferent, and the only interest manifested by any Rebel in the welfare of any 
prisoner was by the Masonic brotherhood.”83 
 The final aspect of the non-natural environment that deserves attention is the 
hospital and medical services provided within the camp.  While no level of care would 
completely eliminate the presence of disease and prisoners succumbing to such ailments, 
even a basic degree of sanitation and medical attention appropriate for the time would have 
had an impact on slowing death’s progress.  At Andersonville, as we have seen with just 
about every other condition, medical care for the prisoners seems to have been almost an 
afterthought, likely contributing, instead of alleviating, the appalling level of suffering.  
Atypical of prisons at the time, the hospital was originally located within the walls of the 
stockade.  Drainage from the creek and the contaminated prison sinks passed directly 
through the hospital grounds.  With such easy access, prisoners stole food, bedding, 
medicines, and supplies with impunity.  By May of 1864, the facility had been relocated 
outside to the southeast corner of the stockade, but the change of scenery did little to 






would by June be in competition for supplies with the newly constructed “Sumter hospital” 
built nearby for Confederate soldiers.   
 Always short on medicines, supplies, and capable surgeons, the hospital would 
become the “chief cause of high mortality at Andersonville.”  May 1864 saw 8.2% of all 
patients admitted to the hospital die from their ailment.  By June, the number had jumped 
to 15.1%.  As the population within the prison swelled in late 1864, the hospital had only 
one doctor for every two hundred patients.84  Competent physicians, however, were in short 
supply throughout the south.  The Chief Surgeon, Dr. Isaiah White, was described as 
“gentlemen of fair abilities and attainments;” however, he seemed to be the exception 
rather than the rule.   Private McElroy, who volunteered in and around the hospital to escape 
the daily horrors of the stockade, would describe the majority of the physicians as a “class 
of illiterate and unlearning quacks” who sometimes resorted to “country” remedies of 
reading a verse from the Bible to stop bleeding, or curing “fits” via the killing of a black 
cat “in the dark of the moon.”85  Admission to the hospital was regarded by patients as a 
“death warrant” with estimates of the number of patients who died during “treatment” as 
high as 76%.  Diarrhea and dysentery were the primary causes of death, but scurvy, 
gangrene, smallpox, and typhoid fever also claimed thousands.  Conditions within the 
hospital were unsanitary and deplorable.  With a shortage of beds, patients slept on the 
ground, often covered in flies and maggots that infested the facility.  Frequent amputations 
led to “hospital gangrene” and infections that the doctors simply did not know how to treat.  
In an August 6, 1864, letter to General Winder, Dr. White would stress that the unsanitary 
and deadly conditions at Andersonville were entirely “within the power of proper 






inspected the camp in August 1864, agreed that the conditions were correctable.  While 
stressing that the care was due more to carelessness and inattentive attitudes, rather than 
malevolence, Dr. Jones railed on the Confederate government for their “absence of 
intelligent organization and division of labor . . . the almost total absence of system, 
government, and rigid but wholesome sanitary regulations.”86  On August 23rd, 1864, Dr. 
Jones would witness patients at the hospital dying at the alarming rate of one man every 
eleven minutes.  His report to the Surgeon General’s Office of the Confederacy would urge 
changes to sanitation, food quality, and medical practices if “not only for the sake of 
suffering humanity, but also on account of our own brave soldiers now captive in the hands 
of the Federal Government.”87 Despite the recommendations and pleas for help, little 
would change at Andersonville. 
 In the Fall of 1864, Dr. White would be promoted to chief surgeon and inspector of 
all military hospitals in Georgia and Alabama, and Dr. R. Randolph Stevenson would take 
his place as the head physician at Andersonville.  By December, Dr. Stevenson would be 
removed under suspicion of shady spending practices.  A subsequent investigation would 
reveal that nearly $100,000 was embezzled by Stevenson during his brief tenure.  Regarded 
as “a poor medical man and no surgeon,” Stevenson’s “gross fraud” would go unpunished 
due to the demise of the Confederacy prior to the completion of an official report.  His 
replacement, Dr. H.H. Clayton, would see a reduction in patients due to transfers, and a 
slight improvement in the quantity of food and medical supplies, resulting in lower death 
rates for the early months of 1865.88  The damage, however, had been done not only in 
terms of the loss of lives, but also in destroying the morale and mental well-being of the 






 With so much overt suffering occurring daily at Andersonville, our final effect of 
activities and amusements on prisoner morale seems almost like an inconsequential 
afterthought.  And yet, even in the conditions that one prisoner would describe as “a human 
Dead Sea,” distractions from the day-to-day misery of the camp impacted the mental well-
being of individual prisoners.89  While many Yankees seemed resigned to their suffering 
and eventual demise, others would engage in games of chance with dice, cards, and “chuck-
a-luck boards.”  Private McElroy would fashion a chess set out of a “soft, white root in the 
swamp,” with pieces blackened with pitch pine soot.  Using a scavenged plank for the 
board, the game would serve “until our release to distract our attention from much of the 
surrounding misery.”90  Others would pass the time writing letters home, entering daily 
activities in their diaries, and tending to their less fortunate fellow inmates.  Mail service 
was sporadic and expensive for prisoners who had to purchase stationary and stamps from 
their captors.  All mail was censored for negative comments about the camp, or any other 
information that might be deemed inappropriate.  Such screening was a common practice 
in Civil War POW camps, and thus while letters sent home by inmates are a valuable source 
for historians, they often do not contain accurate portrayals of the actual conditions within 
such camps. 
 With no chaplain or established place of worship, the practice of religion was 
usually personal, rather than an organized activity.  However, some effort was made by 
inmates to hold prayer meetings and religious services.  Held in random spots throughout 
the camp, attendance was low due not only to the inconsistency, but also because many 
were too sick or weak to join in.  Catholic priests such as Father Peter Whelan, Father John 






the camp, leading “many Protestants and many unbelievers” to convert.91  Father Clavreul, 
who would serve Andersonville for over a month before getting sick himself, kept detailed 
records of the number of men to which he administered sacraments and performed 
baptisms.  From July 15th to August 19, 1864, Clavreul would bless 326 prisoners, and 
perform baptisms on fourteen new converts to the faith.92  There are no records of men from 
any other denomination serving the camp, despite the South, and the United States, being 
a predominantly Protestant country during the mid-nineteenth century. 
 While these minimal activities certainly played their part in providing prisoners a 
distraction to pass the time, and at least temporarily improving ones mental well-being, 
they were in no way comparable to the amusements seen at other camps.  There were no 
bands, markets, debate clubs, and libraries as seen at Elmira.  There were no organized 
religious services and trading with locals as seen during the early period at Camp Groce.  
And there certainly were no baseball games, dances, visits from local Southern belles for 
poetry readings, and camp newspapers as was seen at the almost picturesque Camp Ford.  
Such activities expressed individuality, but also created a collective comradery among the 
prisoners that was sorely lacking at Andersonville. With little to no activities to build 
morale and distract from the realities of camp, some would quickly lose the will to live. As 
Private Lessel Long of the 13th Indiana Infantry would discover, “many stout men would 
come in her and, after looking at the horrible conditions of things, would sicken and die 
inside of ten or twelve days.”93  At Andersonville, the primary activity for most inmates 







 As General Sherman’s army marched through Georgia in the latter months of 1864, 
Confederate officials feared an uprising, or worse a rescue, of the inmates at Andersonville.  
On September 5, 1864, Samuel Cooper, Adjutant General and Inspector General of the 
Confederacy, ordered an evacuation of Andersonville.  Thousands were moved to sites in 
Savannah, Georgia, and Charleston, South Carolina, where facilities were lacking and local 
officials were not prepared for the transfer.  Near Millen, Georgia, the Confederacy was 
scrambling to complete a new prison, Camp Lawton, that would hold over 40,000 men.  
Opened in October of 1864, the 42 acre camp would eventually house approximately 
10,000 prisoners transferred mostly from Andersonville, but would close after only six 
weeks when Sherman’s troops neared the facility.  During their short stay, however, at 
Camp Lawton, prisoners would comment on the improved conditions “we get double the 
amount of beef that we did at Camp Sumter, and of a great deal better quality,” further 
evidence that the South was perhaps not as devoid of rations as it initially seems.94   In 
Charleston, over 400 prisoners transferred from Andersonville “broke loose from the 
guards, plundered the citizens in the vicinity of the camp for food and clothing, and 
attempted to destroy the railroad . . . others headed for the woods in a quest to escape.”95  
Once free of their captives, the POW’s did what so many other soldiers had done 
throughout the war, resorted to self-care for survival.  Soldiers from the South Carolina 
and Georgia Reserves, men considered too old or infirmed to fight, and boys too young for 
the front lines, were pressed into service to guard the prisoners at their new locations.   
On November 21, 1864, as the Confederacy was in free fall, General Winder was 
appointed as Commissary General of all Confederate Prisons, creating a central authority 






threatened by the advancing Yankee armies, thousands of prisoners would be returned to 
Andersonville in April of 1865, even as Lee was preparing to surrender at Appomattox.  
For others, the trek to new facilities would be their last.  Between October 5, 1864 and 
February 1, 1865, 3,479 of the 10,321 prisoners transferred from Georgia to Salisbury 
prison in North Carolina would die at their new home, creating a death rate of 33.7%, 
higher than what was experienced even at Andersonville.96  In The Yankee Plague (2016), 
Lorien Foote argues that the Confederate prison system placed a burden on military 
operations, and was consequently intertwined with its downfall.  She adds that the lack of 
“systematic analysis of how the process of capturing soldiers on the battlefield, transporting 
them behind the lines, and holding them in prisons near active military operations was 
connected to military logistics” has created “a gaping hole in the scholarly literature of the 
Civil War.”97  In short, as went the prison system, so went the military and the Confederacy.  
By early 1865, nearly 3,000 Union prisoners had escaped from their makeshift camps and 
were on the loose in Georgia and South Carolina.  A South Carolina newspaper, the 
Edgefield Advertiser, would lament in November of 1864 that the prisoners “seem to be 
everywhere . . . they actually cover the land like the locusts of Egypt.”98   
At Andersonville, locals feared a confrontation with the Yankees in the region, “for 
the horrors of the stockade have so enraged them that they will have no mercy on this 
country, though they have brought it all on themselves.”  Eliza Andrews, feared that 
Sherman’s army was so eager to avenge the atrocities at Andersonville that “they will spare 
neither man, woman nor child in all South-West Georgia.”99  With the Confederate 
surrenders in April of 1865, the camp would cease operations and the last of the prisoners 






over time, and the South endeavored to forget what had happened in this otherwise peaceful 
corner of Georgia.  The North, however, would not let the memories fade.  Union officials 
such as Secretary of War Edwin Stanton would remind Americans of “the enormity of the 
crime committed by the rebels towards our prisoners” via “a deliberate system of savage 
and barbarous treatment.”100  Newspapers would continue to re-print the tales of horror and 
tragedy for a generation to come, including poems like that about Andersonville prisoner  
John Whipple which lamented: 
In a loathsome fetid prison,  
No covering but the sky,  
Our long lost brother pined, weary months, 
And then laid him down to die. 
 
Afar from the graves of his kindred. 
Where the Northern wildflowers grow,  
His grave has been made by stranger hands 
Where no trees will o’er it flow.101 
While contemporaries and historians alike have debated who was to blame for the 
atrocities, what is certain is that the locals were well aware of what was happening inside 
Andersonville, even visiting to witness the horrors for themselves.  Transfers of prisoners 
would lead to yet another group of eyewitnesses who may have felt sympathy, but 
otherwise turned a blind eye.  Georgians such as Eliza Andrews would fain remorse, while 
maintaining their predetermined level of animosity, “they were half-naked, and such a 
poor, miserable, starved-looking set of wretches that we couldn’t help feeling sorry for 
them in spite of their wicked war against our country . . . some of the prisoners had the 
impudence to kiss their hands at us.”102 
In the decades that followed the war, the site at Andersonville would go through 






forgotten.  In January of 1866, just nine months after the end of the Civil War, the area near 
the cemetery would become the site of a freedman community of ex-slaves where they 
“honored the meaning of the war, the prison, and the deaths that occurred there.”103    In 
October of 1866, the old hospital building would be converted into a freedman’s school, 
the American Missionary Normal School.  For the next several decades, Memorial Day 
events would be held annually at Andersonville, attended mostly by African Americans 
and a few Union veterans returning to the site of their suffering.  The site, however, was 
largely ignored by federal officials and the white locals in Georgia.  In 1893, in pursuit of 
increased tourism, the Women’s Relief Corps (WRC) purchased the site of the prison and 
took over its care.  In March of 1910, the WRC would gift the site to the federal 
government, making Andersonville the first, and only, Confederate prison preserved and 
maintained by the U.S. government.104   In 1970, nearly one hundred five years after the 
closing of the camp, the Andersonville burial site was finally designated as a national 
cemetery, merging the prison and the burial site into the Andersonville National Historical 
Site.  With the first national military parks being established at Chickamauga, Gettysburg, 
Shiloh, et al, starting in 1895, the fact that it took another seventy five years to 
commemorate Andersonville is a testament to our desire to honor and celebrate the perils 
of battle, while at the same time trying to ignore the atrocities and sins of our POW systems.  
One speaks to glory, while the other speaks to our lack of humanity.  In 1998, 
Andersonville became home to the National Prisoner of War Museum to honor POW’s 
from all American conflicts.  Creating an “idealized interpretation of the experience of 
prisoners of war as a celebration of patriotism,” instead of addressing the often hard-to- 






experience of Andersonville and makes it more palatable to the general public, which 
perhaps was the intent of the National Park Service.105  Merging the events of multiple wars 
into one POW experience, the museum also ignores the idiosyncrasies of the Civil War 
that differentiate it from all other U.S. conflicts, and fails to highlight the individual 
experiences of those at Andersonville and its counterparts across the county.  As Benjamin 
G. Cloyd comments in Haunted by Atrocity, today “tourists encounter an idealized rather 
than actual history . . . Civil War prisons now provoke mere curiosity instead of inspiring 
cause.”106  The Andersonville National Cemetery, however, remains today a painful 
reminder of our past, and a lasting monument to inhumanity, with 13,714 graves of Union 
prisoners, and 921 marked as “unknown.” 107   
Traveling a short distance to the still tiny town of Andersonville, tourists today can 
also see a curious marble obelisk, donated in 1909 by the Georgia Chapter of the United 
Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC), to the memory of Captain Wirz.  The UDC lamented 
that they had no monuments “to bear witness to the Truth . . . to the brave testimony of 
Wirtz and the men who died with him.”108  Lost in the fevered pitch is the irony that in their 
desire to preserve the “truth,” they were unable to even spell the Andersonville 
commandant’s name correctly.  Nonetheless, forever seeking justification for the sins of 
the South, the monument as it stands today states that its benefactors erected it to “rescue 
his name from the stigma attached to it by embittered prejudice.”109  Father Henry Clavreul, 
a Catholic priest who attended to prisoners at Andersonville, would comment in later years 
about Wirz, “I think, that the poor man is no more worthy of a monument now than he was 








  Comparison of All Four Camps 
 No matter the conditions, the reality is that each and every one of the sites used 
during the American Civil War were still prisoner of war camps that were just livable at 
best.  Soldiers who may have seen incarceration as a reasonable alternative to fighting soon 
realized that lying on a sloping, open field at Fredericksburg with bullets whizzing over 
your head was preferable to starving to death, or slowly withering away due to scurvy and 
dysentery, at Andersonville.  This represents a dramatic shift in the attitude towards 
surrender and/or capture from the start of the war.  Pre-1863, soldiers on both sides were 
not averse to being taken prisoner since such an event usually led to either an immediate 
exchange, or a parole that allowed one to stay on the sidelines until a formal exchange 
could be carried out.  As discussed in Chapter One, some soldiers even took advantage of 
the system to avoid a return to combat.  In considering what it meant to be a POW in the 
Civil War, it is important to understand that nineteenth-century attitudes towards surrender 
did not necessarily place a stigma on the practice such as it might today.  At the start of the 
war, the acceptance of surrender as a viable option “grew out of inherited notions that 
surrender helped to distinguish civilized warfare from barbarism” and allowed combatants 
“to recognize the humanity in their enemy.”1  Major Robert Anderson would set the 
standard for surrender, and become a hero in the process, when he relinquished Fort Sumter 
in April of 1861.  As David Silkenat explains in his book Raising the White Flag (2019), 
Anderson’s actions became the prototype for an honorable surrender by first fighting 






and second, negotiating terms of the surrender “so as not to disgrace either himself or his 
soldiers.”2  The reality of surrender, however, was not always an honorable endeavor.  
General Grant’s demand of unconditional surrender at Fort Donelson in February of 1862, 
and the massacre of surrendered African American troops by Confederate soldiers under 
the command of General Nathan Bedford Forrest at Fort Pillow in April of 1864, as well 
as other questionable surrenders throughout, raised the specter of whether or not 
capitulation was still virtuous.  And yet, with the Dix-Hill Cartel still in place as late as 
Fall of 1863, soldiers preferred prison over the grave as “those captured in battle usually 
outnumbered those killed.”  With the collapse of the exchange system, and the conflict 
entering a period of what historians have referred to as “hard war” by 1864, surrender 
became a less than favorable option, both for survival and for honor.3  As the realities of 
war moved deeper into the South, Confederates “increasingly equated surrender with ruin 
and devastation.”  Instead of surrendering “for a brief respite of quiet,” Rebels were 
encouraged to continue “fighting, struggling, dying for the cause of civilization, religion, 
and good morals.”4  Despite these shifting attitudes of honor, dignity, survival, and the 
preference to die in combat fighting for one’s cause rather than wasting away in a prison 
far from home, over 673,000 soldiers would surrender during the Civil War, a figure nearly 
equal to the number of soldiers killed during the conflict. 
Once the exchange system broke down in late 1863, and long term incarceration 
became the norm, soldiers’ attitudes toward imprisonment changed accordingly, especially 
after stories of the conditions at Andersonville, Elmira, Libby Prison, et al, became front 
page news.  The end of the exchange cartel, combined with a shortage of adequate facilities 






conditions of the camps.  Despite the best efforts of a Colonel Allen at Camp Ford, or the 
efforts by the Commissary Department to secure adequate supplies at Elmira, sickness and 
death still occurred, at times on a scale that is unimaginable today.  The already poor 
conditions could also be made worse by the deprivations of a Colonel Gillespie at Camp 
Groce, or the reckless indifference of a Confederate system from the top down at 
Andersonville.  Notwithstanding their basic similarities, the camps were certainly different 
in size, conditions, management and, consequently, death rates.  Nevertheless, the five 
factors discussed herein affected each camp in the same way, increasing or decreasing 
morale and the rate of survival, albeit to varying degrees.  
 When it comes to the factors affecting one’s likelihood to survive, all things are 
assuredly not equal.  While activities and amusements certainly played a role in improving 
morale and distracting prisoners from the reality of their situation, alone they could do little 
to prevent the suffering.  Music, reading, crafting, and a game of baseball were of little 
consequence if one was too weak or too sick to participate, or was living in constant fear 
of being targeted by an apathetic guard who “would like nothing better than to shoot one 
of the scoundrels just for the fun of it.”5  Likewise, the role played by imprisoned officers 
also had a limited impact.  While the organization and discipline by officers could improve 
conditions and increase the chance of survival, such actions had a diminished effect when 
the more dominant factors were not in the prisoners’ favor.  For example, officers could 
utilize the natural environment to their advantage by digging sinks to separate out clean 
drinking water like they did at Camp Ford.  However, when the only source of water is 
polluted almost from the start, and accessible only by crossing a disease-ridden, maggot-






the conditions were likely to fail.  Despite their best efforts, officers had to watch their 
fellow soldiers suffer both physically and mentally.  Colonel Duganne would dread seeing 
the emotional degradation of a prisoner, listening to “the feeble sighs of manhood lapsing 
into infant weakliness” as soldiers who were fearless in battle lie “here now as tremulous 
and fearful as a girl.”6 
 The local, non-natural environment is the third least, or the third most, significant 
factor, depending on one’s approach.  Access to proper medical care and adequate facilities 
was crucial to a prisoner’s chances of survival.  The well-maintained hospital at Camp Ford 
in the early months kept the death rate below 4.0%.  In sharp contrast, the deplorable 
conditions and inadequate doctors at Andersonville resulted in the death of an estimated 
76% of all inmates that had the misfortune to be admitted to the hospitals.  The ability to 
supplement one’s diet and lifestyle via trade with the locals, had an obvious impact on a 
prisoner’s well-being.  Such assistance and interaction could offset some of the deleterious 
effects of the natural environment, while also improving morale.  We see the immediate 
and obvious impact of this factor when the prisoners were deprived of interaction with the 
locals at Camp Groce and Andersonville.  Groce becomes the starkest example as the 
termination of trade in 1864 contributed to the dramatic increase in the death rate that was 
nearly five times what it had been in 1863 when trade was allowed.  As with the previously 
mentioned factors, the effect of the local, non-natural environment could not by itself 
prevent sickness and death, but it was significant in alleviating the suffering. 
 The natural environment and the role of the camp commandants are the two most 
critical factors in determining the rate of survival, although it is arguable which one has the 






and medicinal herbs via foraging, are the most essential elements of survival.  However, 
such liberties can be easily taken away by a strict commander like Colonel Gillespie.  Such 
men could have a direct impact on all of the previously discussed factors, effectively 
eliminating any advantages to survival that they may have been created.  Commandants of 
a more caring nature, such as Major Colt and Lt. Colonel Moore at Elmira, would make 
efforts to improve the state of the natural environment by draining the nasty pond, and 
providing coal stoves to combat the chill.  However, neither could control the most basic 
element of nature, the weather.  A harsh New York winter and flooding spring rains would 
cause the most sickness and death of any contributing factor at Elmira. 
 By taking all of the factors into consideration, patterns emerge that show not only 
the significance of each factor, but also how the loss of a critical one can offset nearly all 
of the beneficial attributes of the others.  Camp Ford was open the longest of any of the 
four camps discussed herein, being in operation for nearly two years from July 1863 to 
May 1865.  For much of the life of the camp, all five factors were decidedly in the favor of 
the prisoners, resulting in a remarkably low death rate of 3.86% to 4.78%, depending on 
which set of shaky Confederate records one relies on.  These numbers are even more 
astonishing when you take into account that 63.98% to 78.89% of all deaths occurred 
during the six month period of May to October 1864 when overcrowding at the prison took 
its toll on each of the five factors.  The rise in population made resources scarce, eliminated 
outside trading and visits for safety concerns, and created sanitation issues with the water 
supply and the camp as a whole.  Crowded shelters and streets impacted the time and space 
available for activities, commerce, and amusements to raise morale.  Union officers, now 






months of chaos and the additional 3,000 prisoners, and restore the beneficial effects of the 
five factors, the death rate drops to an unbelievable 1.6% to 3.4% for the remainder of the 
life of the camp. 
 Camp Groce is a tale of two camps, and must be broken up into its two periods of 
operation in 1863 and 1864.  From June to December 1863, the prisoners benefited from 
the five factors and the death rate was a low 4.68%.  However, when the camp reopened 
for operation from May to December 1864, the addition of Colonel Gillespie as 
commandant made all the difference.  By cutting rations, restricting access to the outside 
world, prohibiting non-work related activities, and exhibiting what can be arguably labeled 
abject cruelty, Gillespie eliminated nearly all advantages received from the other four 
factors.  As a result, the death rate skyrocketed to 29.6% for the period, making it higher 
than Andersonville.  With all else remaining mostly unchanged, Camp Groce becomes the 
prime example of how one factor (in this case, the consequences of the camp commander) 
can have a deleterious effect, and even eliminate, the others.  Without Gillespie, the death 
rate would have likely increased a few percentages due to the yellow fever epidemic of 
1864, but not to the level experienced under his arguably criminal indifference.   
 The prison at Elmira has the unfortunate fate of being linked to Andersonville due 
to its comparable death rates.  Made shortly after the war by Southern apologists attempting 
to excuse the horrors of the Georgia camp, this connection between the two is undeserving.  
While it is true that Elmira had an overall death rate of 24.4% during its tenure, the 
prisoners, unlike at Andersonville, benefited from the five factors.  Many, however, were 
sent to the grave by one of them.  The natural environment at Elmira had a greater impact 






offset the others.  The camp was open for a little over a year from July 1864 to July 1865, 
and yet the majority of deaths occurred during two natural events: 1.) the harsh New York 
winter of November 1864 to February 1865 resulting in 40.08% of all deaths that occurred, 
and 2.) the spring flood of March 1865 resulting in 16.0% of all deaths.  If you were to 
eliminate these two weather events, based on the average number of deaths per month for 
the other months of operation, the death rate for Elmira would drop to 16.7%.7  This number 
would still be higher than what is seen at many camps, due to the effect of Foster’s Pond, 
but considerably lower than Andersonville.  What truly separates Elmira from 
Andersonville, however, is that in the Union camp there was a concerted effort to improve 
the prisoners’ chance of survival.  These efforts are rightly subject to criticism, and at times 
fell far short of what we might consider adequate for the time.  Nevertheless, they are a 
definitive improvement over the bureaucratic incompetence, heartless indifference, and 
open cruelty exhibited in Georgia. 
 Of the four camps discussed, Andersonville was the only one that had previously 
not been a site for the host nation’s soldiers.  Ill-conceived, out of the way, and still under 
construction when the first Yankees arrived, the prison had the potential for disaster from 
its inception.  Unlike the other three camps where you can pinpoint one or two distinctive 
factors to explain the high death rates, Andersonville was a continuous site of suffering and 
mortality, making it difficult to identify a specific cause.  Instead, all five factors 
contributed to the high death rate of 28.8%, and no improvement in one factor alone would 
seem to have made much of a difference.  With an oppressive commandant, no Union 
officers to promote order, a lack of activities, poor rations, lack of housing, restrictions that 






Andersonville was a failure almost in its entirety.  While the camp was open from February 
1864 to April 1865, the majority of the deaths occurred between July and November 1864 
when the prison population peaked at over 30,000.  To put that number in perspective, the 
27 acre camp at Andersonville (of which 3.5 acres was occupied by the uninhabitable 
swamp) had a population greater than the cities of Mobile, Alabama, Syracuse, New York, 
Memphis, Tennessee, and Savannah, Georgia, per the 1860 census.  If the nation’s largest 
city at the time, New York, had experienced an epidemic or disaster that resulted in the 
same death rate as seen at Andersonville, over 234,000 people would have perished.8  
Despite the best efforts of apologists, it is difficult today to justify the conditions or the 
actions that took place at the camp in Southwest Georgia, located far away from the view 
of those who were the most responsible for its operation.  Considering the negative impact 
of each of the five factors, it is surprising that the death rate was not actually higher than 
its appalling mark of nearly 30%.  As Sergeant David Kennedy of the 9th Ohio Cavalry 
would comment in his diary kept while at Andersonville, “what a degraded nation to hold 
prisoners and not provide for their wants.”9   
 In summary, while each camp was unique in its size and operation, those who had 
the misfortune to be imprisoned there were, for better or worse, affected by the five factors 
throughout their incarceration.  Even under the best of conditions, death will occur; 
however, a comparison of these camps shows that a little compassion and sense of 
humanity for your fellow man could go a long way to improving morale and the 
opportunity for survival.  Since time and brevity of this paper has limited the analysis to 
just these four camps, my application of the five factors begs for a more extensive study 






South.  Would the results be the same for a prison located indoors in an urban setting, such 
as Libby Prison in Richmond, or an outdoor camp located in a metropolitan area such as 
Camp Douglas in Chicago?  Would the same pattern regarding the five factors emerge in 
a prison that was limited to civilians, spies, and political prisoners, such as Castle Thunder 
in Richmond?  Perhaps more importantly, how would prison operations and the rate of 
survival been affected if both sides had continued to engage in the prisoner exchange 
system throughout the war?  If the Dix-Hill Cartel had not broken down, and soldiers 
continued to be exchanged and paroled under the existing system, arguably the need for 
such large prison facilities as were seen post-1863 would never have materialized.  Short-
term incarceration while awaiting exchange would still have been affected by the five 
factors discussed herein, but not on the same scale as was seen in the large, long-term 
facilities.  The effects of the environment, both natural and non-natural, could certainly still 
affect one’s immediate health.  The presence of officers and activities to maintain morale 
would still be important, but in a lessened capacity due to the anticipated quick release.  A 
harsh commandant in charge of prisoners would be the factor most likely to cause 
immediate harm in a short-term, although allowing such individuals to continue to operate 
would have potentially endangered the exchange process, and thus likely discouraged by 
their respective governments.  The United States would learn from mistakes made in the 
Civil War, and adapt accordingly for future conflicts; however, the dark side of human 
nature still seems to rear its head in times of war as we lose our compassion for our fellow 
man, seeing them only as the enemy.  For those who starved at Andersonville, marched to 






late, and today are reminders that we should not lose our civility, or corrupt humanity, just 
to win over our opponent. 



























  Capt. Wirz versus Col. Gillespie 
 While Captain Henry Wirz of Andersonville is a name forever tied to the sufferings 
of prisoners of war during America’s internal conflict, Colonel Clayton Gillespie of Camp 
Groce is a name known to few historians, and even fewer members of the general public.  
Wirz lives in infamy, while Gillespie is almost lost to history.  One’s life was snuffed out 
at the end of a hangman’s noose as punishment for his war crimes, while the other slipped 
back into society and lived a full and active life.  And yet, the two men both oversaw camps 
that, while certainly different in size, became sites of immense cruelty and suffering.  While 
the culpability of Wirz has been debated for well over a century, a discussion by historians 
of the war crimes of Gillespie, and a comparison between the two, is long overdue.  
 Much of Wirz’s reputation centered around his seemingly endless indifference for 
the suffering he witnessed every day.  When he did have an idea for changes that would 
have benefited the prisoners, he did not push them through to fruition, nor presented them 
as anything more than a passing thought.  Upon his arrival at Andersonville, Wirz 
complained that the bread being issued was “almost unfit for use and (is) increasing 
dysentery,” but made no changes to the quality.  He proposed building two dams to create 
separate drinking and latrine facilities along the creek; however, a lack of tools and 
indifference in the plan by his superiors derailed the project before completion.  There is 
no indication that Wirz ever proposed this, or any other plan to improve the condition of 
the creek thereafter.1  He would complain of the guards “carelessness . . . inefficiency . . . 






he made little to no effort to promote discipline, or stop the cruel dead line shootings that 
occurred on a regular basis.2  Despite the obvious deplorable conditions at the camp, 
Confederate officials would praise Wirz for his “good sense and energy he has displayed 
in the management of the prison” and commend him for being “the only man who seems 
to fully comprehend his important duties.”3  After the war, regretful, but perhaps still not 
remorseful Southerners would attempt to redeem Wirz.  Eliza Andrews would write, “I do 
know that had he been an angel from heaven, he could not have changed the pitiful tale of 
suffering from privation and hunger unless he had possessed the power to repeat the 
miracle of the loaves and fishes.”4 
 To prisoners like the well-written Private McElroy, Wirz was a foul, bitter, servile, 
and temperamental man who “was much more likely to kill without warning, than to warn 
without killing.”  However, McElroy also regarded Wirz as one who was not intentionally 
cruel, but rather “simply contemptible” whose cruelty came from “the ebullitions of a 
peevish, snarling little temper, united to a mind incapable of conceiving the results of his 
acts, or understanding the pain he was inflicting.”5  To those who suffered in the camp, the 
guilt lay not just with the Swiss commandant, but with the entire Confederacy who failed 
in their duties and lost their humanity.  Wirz was “a petty little Captain made to expiate the 
crimes of Generals, Cabinet Officers, and a President . . . how absurd . . . upon the narrow 
shoulders of this pitiful scapegoat was packed the entire sin of Jefferson Davis and his 
crew.”6   
To historians such as Ovid L. Futch, Wirz was unqualified for the task and simply 
a poor choice for the position he held.  The much publicized atrocities in Northern 






by war’s end was beyond punishment, made Wirz “the cynosure of northern 
vindictiveness” and resulted in his “farcical trial.”7  Hesseltine believed that Wirz was 
doomed by Northern propaganda against the failings of the Confederacy and their “cruelty 
and suffering unparalleled in the annals of warfare.”  Described as “the inhuman wretch,” 
“the barbarian,” and “the most bloodthirsty monster which this or any other age has 
produced,” by the Northern media, the outcome of Wirz’s trial may have been a foregone 
conclusion.8  His conviction on nearly a dozen charges, including four murders that 
occurred in August 1864 when he was away from the camp on sick leave, and his 
subsequent execution, satisfied the Northern thirst for retribution.  While the victorious 
Union did hold over 1,000 military tribunals for individuals charged with a variety of war 
crimes, Wirz was the only official convicted and executed for crimes associated with a 
prison camp.  Corporal punishment of ex-Confederates was rare following the war, and 
there are only a handful of other known executions, including Champ Ferguson, a guerrilla 
fighter convicted of murdering over fifty captured Union soldiers, and Robert Kennedy, an 
escaped POW convicted of starting fires at various sites in New York City.  The North was 
ready to move on as concerns of what happened in the war were “displaced by the rapidly 
recurring political movements” of the day.9 
Wirz was certainly made a scapegoat for the failings of the Confederacy; however, 
this does not mean that he was wrongly convicted or undeserving of the fate he received.  
While he may not have deliberately set out to inflict harm, his gross indifference to the 
suffering, combined with his foul temper and violent outbursts, certainly made a case for 
his willful negligence.  What is troubling in this tale is that no one else was held accountable 






them.  The notoriety and sheer size of Andersonville made it the poster child of Southern 
prisoner of war camps gone wrong, so the punishment of its commander may have been 
enough to satiate Northern anger.  Unlike his counterparts at other Confederate camps, 
Wirz was a foreigner, an outsider, who did not talk or act like most Americans.  While it is 
a matter of conjecture, one has to wonder if Wirz was also damned by a play of nineteenth- 
century bigotry that would not have hindered Gillespie or Dick Turner from Libby Prison.  
Prisoners and trial participants mocked his strong accent and broken English, and described 
him as resembling a rodent with dirty features and a repulsive appearance.  Hesseltine 
argues that such biased impressions may have contributed to a wartime psychosis that 
prejudged Wirz and relegated him to his eventual fate.10 
For Colonel Clayton Gillespie, a stronger case for punishment can be made due to 
his seemingly overt cruelty; however, the evidence today is more difficult to track down.  
Due to the relative obscurity of Camp Groce, there is almost no historical writing on the 
actions of the Methodist minister during his tenure as commandant.  His biography on the 
Texas State Historical Association website contains inaccuracies and fails to even mention 
his position at Camp Groce, instead reducing that period of his life to “his regiment was 
ordered to return to Texas, where he stayed near Hempstead until February 1865.”11  What 
we do have, however, is the personal recollections of those who were imprisoned under 
Gillespie, as well as Congressional testimony by Paymaster John Read.  These accounts 
paint a picture of a man who seemed driven by revenge as he showed not only a blatant 
indifference to the suffering, but also went out of his way to exasperate the already harsh 
conditions.  By restricting access to all of the beneficial attributes of the factors discussed 






sheltered but the men left out in the elements, Gillespie was personally responsible for a 
death rate six times higher than that of his predecessor.  What could make a man of religious 
conviction, who wrote love poetry to his dying wife, exhibit such blatant disregard for 
humanity? 
Prior to coming to Camp Groce, Colonel Gillespie had not only been briefly a 
prisoner of war himself, but also endured the death of his brother, Fleming Laurie Gillespie, 
at the Battle of Champion Hill (Baker’s Creek) in May of 1863.12  These two events 
undoubtedly had an impact on Gillespie’s regard for the Yankees, for as we have previously 
noted, he avowed retaliation to avenge his fellow rebels’ mistreatment at the hands of the 
North.  Did Gillespie always have a bitter disposition that was prone to acts of revenge and 
cruelty, or was he, like so many others, jaded by the realities of war?  Since few accounts 
of his actions prior to the war are available, we are left to piece together his war psyche 
from what little evidence can be found.  Showing a gentle and remorseful spirit upon the 
death of his first wife in 1853, Gillespie would write a loving poem, to “the lady of the 
peach like cheeks . . . our mutual love will bring relief . . . the gentle moon with pensive 
light shine full upon the slumbering sea; all things repose in nursing night, but I am sad: I 
am not with thee . . . O loveliest, dearest Caroline, nought else on earth so dear to me, I’d 
sooner now this life resign, than claim love unblest by thee.”13  While imprisoned at Camp 
Chase, Gillespie delivered a stirring sermon to his fellow inmates in March of 1863, in 
which he compared them to the persecuted Hebrews of the Old Testament and insisted that 
if the “South should ultimately be forced to humble her honor before the hated power 






actions yet to come, Gillespie added “the guilt of the immense bloodshed, and woe, and 
waste of this war, rests upon other heads than ours.”14   
As previously noted, after the war, Gillespie would be described by his 
contemporaries as a brute, scoundrel, and less than a gentlemen.  Regardless of the image 
that we can piece together from the minimal evidence, what is known is that during his 
tenure at Camp Groce, Gillespie acted with deliberate intent to worsen the conditions, 
lower morale, and increase the level of suffering.  These actions were taken not out of 
necessity for safety, or due to the lack of supplies and support from his superiors, but rather 
through the overt malice of a commander either bent on revenge, or who simply did not 
have the capacity for compassion for his fellow Americans from the North.  With such 
damning testimonials from prisoners and Confederate guards, how did Gillespie escape the 
same fate as Wirz?  While his actions may have been more deserving of corporal 
punishment, three factors helped Gillespie escape without recourse.  First, the size, scope, 
and relative obscurity of Camp Groce did not make it a regular topic in Northern 
newspapers, nor a target for retribution after the war.  While Andersonville is known today 
by those with even a passing interest in U.S. history, Camp Groce is mostly forgotten, and 
rarely even appears on the lists of Civil War prisoner of war camps.   If the Confederacy 
had chosen Camp Groce as a primary location for prisoners, and had allowed the population 
to swell to over 20,000, would we today be referring to the little camp in Hempstead as the 
“Andersonville of the West,” and would Gillespie have faced a more appropriate fate?  Due 
to its location so far to the west, such an increase, however, was never likely.  Second, as 
was have seen with other larger, more infamous, Confederate camps, after the commandant 






most in the government and the populace were eager to move on.  Finally, and perhaps the 
most critical factor, the atrocities committed at Camp Groce during the tenure of Gillespie 
were not witnessed by third parties.  With the camp’s closure and parole of all prisoners by 
March 1865, there was no site of suffering prisoners for Union troops to discover.  There 
were no photographs to be taken and distributed throughout the north of emaciated 
prisoners that more resembled twentieth-century Holocaust victims than Civil War 
soldiers.  By war’s end, Captain Wirz could still be found at his post at Andersonville.  






















  EPILOGUE 
 Despite the described differences between Camp Groce, Camp Ford, Elmira, and 
Andersonville, one cannot overlook the fact that they were all places of involuntary 
confinement that left their marks on their unfortunate inhabitants.  The camps also, 
however, left their marks on the nearby communities, as well as the natural environment 
surrounding them.  As with all places directly touched by the tragedy of the American Civil 
War, the people and the land would take years to heal, with many individuals never fully 
returning to the attitudes, compassion, and confidence of their pre-war sensibilities.  Kate 
Stone, writing in 1864 with almost a full year of hostilities yet to come, would regrettably 
say “people do not mourn their dead as they used to . . . everyone seems to live only in the 
present – just from day to day – otherwise I fancy many would go crazy.”1  Throughout the 
North and the South, prisoners of war would return home, many with physical impairments 
that would affect, and often shorten, their lives; perhaps even more would return with the 
unseen emotional scars that would never allow them to leave their experiences in the past.  
Thousands of veterans would pen memoirs, or publish their wartime diaries, as a way to 
not only bring closure to their experiences, but also for profit and pensions.  Such 
recollections, while a valuable resource to historians today, must be read with an 
understanding that many were written to sensationalize the experiences for the paying 
customer, or to further a postwar ideology.  In the South, the Lost Cause narrative would 
create “a deflective memory” that “blamed the Union government and war policies for the 






condemnation of places like Andersonville would fuel Southern apologists to justify the 
honor of the Confederate war effort and commemorate the sacrifices made by Southern 
prisoners at the hand of the Yankees, while ignoring almost all culpability.2  Unfortunately, 
clinging to the Lost Cause also hindered Southern acceptance of their failings on the subject 
of racial equality as well.  Cloyd argues that “the refusal to admit any responsibility for 
racial atrocities indicated the southern determination to remember the Civil War as a failed 
revolution to protect white southern rights instead of a successful revolution to recognize 
African American citizenship.”3 
The severity of those experiences, and whether or not the prisoner survived to come 
home at all, were affected by the five factors discussed herein.  One can only imagine how 
much better life would have been at Camp Groce if they had had a reliable source of clean 
water, or a compassionate commander throughout.  Despite having one of the lowest 
overall death rates of any camp during the war, it is easy to justify that rate at Camp Ford 
being even lower if not for the terrible overcrowding that destroyed the “idyllic village” in 
1864.  The historiography of Civil War POW camps has taken on a variety of forms since 
the publication of Hesseltine’s book in 1930, and yet few works have attempted to look for 
commonality from one prison to another.  This paper has been an attempt to synthesis the 
various approaches, bridging the gap between micro and macro monographs, analyzing 
governmental and public policy while not ignoring environment, personal experiences and 
individual commitments to survival. By doing so, it is my hope that this work helps create 
a framework to objectively study the camp conditions in order to find patterns related to 
survival, instead of just summarily  laying blame or making excuses.  Using the five factors 






discussions of shortages, sanitation, overcrowding, and bureaucratic failings, historians 
should continue to examine individual camps, and the personal experiences of the 
prisoners, but with an understanding that certain factors, such as environment and camp 
command, are applicable across the entire POW system.   
This micro-macro hybrid is the primary approach of this paper, and the 
recommended usage of the five factors herein.  However, one could also utilize the factors 
on a focused micro scale.  To continue advancing Civil War POW historiography, it is also 
important for us to begin to understand why certain prisoners survived, while others 
perished in short order.  It is horrifying today to realize that almost 30% of the prisoners at 
Andersonville died, and yet conversely, that also means that nearly 70% survived their 
ordeal.  This cannot be explained by falling back on the safe path of blaming poor 
conditions and harsh treatment, since all inmates went through relatively the same 
experiences.  The five factors can be used to help researchers separate one prisoner from 
another, and to analyze why some prisoners had improved morale, practiced better hygiene, 
or had less exposure to the detrimental aspects of the environment.  Admittedly, 
characteristics such as personal determination, stronger genetic make-up, and just dumb 
luck, are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify, so a complete picture of why one prisoner 
survived and another did not is likely beyond our research capabilities.  However, future 
historians could still use the five factors herein on an almost super micro level to ascertain 
patterns of survival within a certain regiment, or within a specific group based on 
geographic, ethnic, or socio-economic conditions.  Such small scale analysis would be a 
fascinating, but likely daunting, project requiring examination of the circumstances 






if the patterns discovered ring true in studies of subsequent groups and/or subsequent 
camps. 
 After the Union army destroyed what was left of Camp Ford in July of 1865, the 
site sat largely forgotten, perhaps intentionally, by the locals for nearly one hundred years.  
Smith County would take ownership of the majority of the land in the early half of the 
twentieth century, but for public use, not historical remembrance.  In the late 1920’s, State 
Highway 271 would be constructed across the Northwest corner of the camp, forever 
scarring the original footprint of the stockade.  For the next several decades, the land 
remained in private and public hands, seeing the construction of a roadside picnic area in 
the 1950’s near the site of the old spring.  The location of the largest Confederate POW 
camp west of the Mississippi would remain in obscurity until the publication of Camp Ford 
CSA: The Story of Union Prisoners in Texas, by F. Lee Lawrence and Dr. Robert Glover 
in 1964.  Coinciding with Civil War centennial remembrances, the book briefly renewed 
local interest in the camp; however, the attention quickly faded in the Vietnam era as 
Americans did not want to be reminded of the wartime suffering of our past.  In 1989, Dr. 
Glover and local attorney, Randal B. Gilbert, would spark new interest in Camp Ford with 
an extensive essay published in the Chronicles of Smith County, Texas.  Fresh on its heels, 
the Camp Ford Historical Association was formed in the early 1990’s to raise funds to 
purchase portions of the site.  Camp Ford, today, is a place of quiet reflection.  It is a well-
maintained historical site, complete with a walking trail, interpretive markers, and 
recreated “shebangs.”  Numerous local articles have been written on the camp, and its 
memories are actively kept alive by the Smith County Historical Society, as well as by 






University explored the site and located original wall trenches, drainage ditches, latrines, 
house floors, refuse pits, and even all four sides of the original stockade.  Today the camp 
sits at the intersection of State Highway 271 and NE Loop 323, on the northeast side of 
Tyler.  A gas station and convenience store sits across Highway 271 from the camp on the 
site of the prison hospital.  The location of what is left of the original camp cemetery has 
been obscured and is occupied today by private residences.  “Living history” events are 
held annually at the site by the Tyler Sons of Confederate Veterans.  
 Camp Groce, in almost expected contrast, is today a site nearly forgotten.  Owned 
almost in its entirety by private entities, the site is comprised of open fields, wooded terrain, 
and a few manmade structures just south of State Highway 290, and west of Farm to Market 
Road 359, on the east side of Hempstead.  The state historical marker acknowledging 
“Clear Creek Confederate War Camps” is in the wrong spot, located almost a mile away 
from the site of Camp Groce itself.  In recent years, efforts by Danial Lisarelli and other 
local enthusiasts, have led to the finding of the final resting places of many of the prisoners, 
and a few guards, who died either in the camp, or at one of the hospitals in Hempstead.  
The numbers tell us, however, that several other graves remain undiscovered.  In 2019, the 
Waller County Historical Society finally placed an historical marker (created in 2017) at 
the site of the discovered Camp Groce Cemetery on the east side of FM 359.  While these 
actions are commendable, the actual site of the Camp Groce stockade remains unmarked 
and draws little interest, other than the occasional digging by local artifact hunters.  
Commercial development along Highway 290 threatens the footprint of the camp, and 
continues today largely unabated by any concerns for historical preservation.   During the 






were discovered, and then unceremoniously reburied in the median between the new 
roadways.  The construction of a Sonic restaurant in recent years just north of Hwy 290 
revealed numerous artifacts, including one hole that contained over two hundred Civil War 
era musket balls.  All items found remain in the possession of private collectors.4  
According to the Waller County Historical Society, there are currently no plans to acquire 
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Item #1:  There are no known photographs or contemporary drawings of Camp Groce 
available.  The sketch below is from the memoir of Colonel J.H. Duganne, published in 
1865.  The small barrack on the left side was for the guards, while the longer one on the 
right housed the Union prisoners.  Note that this sketch is from the earliest days of the 
camp, prior to the construction of the stockade walls in the Fall of 1863. (Source: J.H. 

















Item #2:  Wood cut engraving of Camp Ford drawn by Corp. James S. McClain, of the 
120th Ohio Infantry, captured on May 3, 1864, and held as a prisoner of war until May 
27, 1865.  The post-war lithograph was first published in 1885, although its date of 




















Item #3:  Diagram of the general layout, including street names, at Camp Ford in March 
of 1864, prior to the increase in prisoner population.  Located in the archives of the Smith 
County Historical Society, the creator of the map is unknown.  The baseball field 
mentioned in the personal account of several prisoners would have been located off of 
this map, just to the right of the building marked “42nd Mass. Mess.” (Courtesy of the 













Item #4:  Top = Colonel Robert T.P. Allen, commandant of Camp Ford from November 
1863 to May 1864. (Courtesy of the University of Texas at Tyler) 
Bottom = Colonel Clayton Crawford Gillespie, commandant of Camp Groce from May to 










Item #5:  First page of Volume 1, Issue 3 of “The Old Flag” newspaper created by 
Captain William H. May at Camp Ford.  This is a reprinted copy made after the war by 
May, who was able to smuggle his originals papers and printing tools out of the camp.  
No original copies of the newspaper are known to exist today. (Courtesy of the 







Item #6:  Diagram of Elmira Prison created by David J. Coffman of the 7th Virginia 
Calvary, a prisoner of war at Elmira from 1864 to 1865.  Likely drawn after the Civil 
War, the map depicts Foster’s Pond flowing across the interior, and the gardens created 
by Lt. Colonel Moore in April of 1865 in the upper left hand corner. (Courtesy of the 















Item #7:  Photograph of Elmira Prison likely taken in the Fall of 1864 from one of the 
“viewing stands” located along Water Street.  Note the substantial number of constructed 
barracks for the prisoners, unlike at Andersonville where little to no shelter was provided. 


























Item #8:  Top = Major Henry V. Colt, commandant of Elmira Prison from July to 
October 1864. (Courtesy of the Chemung County Historical Society) 
Bottom = Lt. Colonel Stephen Moore, commandant of Elmira Prison from October 1864 









Item #9:  Depiction of Andersonville Prison created by Quartermaster John L. Ransom of 
the 9th Michigan Volunteer Cavalry, a prisoner from early 1864 until the end of the war.  
Ransom kept an extensive diary while at Andersonville, which he published, along with 
this lithograph, in 1882.  Note the inclusion of the gallows in the upper left hand corner 
where the six leaders of the “Raiders” were hung in July of 1864. (Source: John L. Ransom, 












Item #10:  Photograph of Andersonville Prison showing the all-purpose creek and putrid 
swamp in the foreground.  The background shows the overcrowded conditions and 
makeshift shelters of prisoners fortunate to have any type of roof over their head.  Note 
that this photograph was taken in August of 1864 when the population of the prison swelled 


















Item #11:  Top = Captain Henry Wirz, commandant of Andersonville Prison from March 
1864 to April 1865.  (Courtesy of the National Archives, Washington D.C.) 
Bottom = General John H. Winder, commissary general of Confederate prisons in Georgia 
and Alabama from 1864 until his death in February of 1865. (Courtesy of the National 
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